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THE MARYLAND GROUND RENT-MYSTERIOUS
BUT BENEFICIAL*
By FRANK A. KAUFMAN**
Some questions are often asked and seldom answered.
Baltimore has its share of these: What is the ground rent
system?1 Where did it come from? Of what importance
is it? Has it any connection with the many rows of redbrick houses and white steps by which Baltimore is so
often remembered by passing motorists?
These problems until recently were mainly of interest
to lawyers, real estate men, and investors of Baltimore and
the immediate vicinity; but with the advent of such Federal
agencies as the Home Owner's Loan Corporation and the
Federal Housing Administration, they have also become
important to the men charged with the local administration of those agencies. Some of these men who are not
Baltimoreans are rather bewildered by the intricacies of
the ground rent system. Thus, it seems particularly appropriate at this time to investigate some of the habits of
the ground rent animal.
* The author, while taking full responsibility for the views expressed,
wishes to express his deep appreciation to the following men for their
assistance:
Professor A. James Casner, of the Harvard Law School,
under whose direction the paper was originally prepared in a research
course in that School; Hon. Oscar Leser, of the Baltimore City Bar, who
not only read the manuscript and offered most helpful and constructive
criticisms, but also made available his personal collection of ground
rent data; and Messrs. Joseph S. Goldsmith, Louis J. Jira, R. Dorsey
Watkins, J. Charles Gutberlet, and George Gump of the Baltimore City
Bar, all of whom read all or parts of the paper and offered valuable
criticisms.
** Of the Baltimore City Bar. A. B., 1937, Dartmouth College; LL. B.,
1940, Harvard Law School.
The Maryland ground rent system is centered mainly in Baltimore City
and the adjacent counties. Lewis, The Tamat ion o MarylUnd Ground
Renta (1939) 8 Md. L. Rev. 814, 816, n. & However, there are a few ground
rents in other parts of the state. See Anderson v. Power Co., 162 Md. 501,
160 A. 286 (1932) involving several Port Deosit (Md.) ground rents.
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What ground rents were up to and including the year
1883 has been set forth by Lewis Mayer in his book, Ground
Rents in Maryland.2 This 1883 treatise is the only entire
text devoted to the subject, despite the fact that the 1940
ground rent is a very different animal from its 1883 ancestor. Why Baltimore has innumerable rows of similar
houses has often been attributed to the ground rent system s
despite the fact that row houses are just as prevalent in
other large eastern cities." It is true that the Baltimore
rows and ground rent system developed hand in hand, but
Baltimore would seemingly have had its red brick houses
without its ground rents.
Ground rents are mysterious beings. A recent writer
has remarked that he "long labored under the impression
that they popped out of the ground in the spring, only to
dash back again in terror of their own shadow." 5 Actually, a modern day ground rent is a first cousin to a purchase money mortgage. That the ground rent system in its
present day form is an exceedingly beneficial and useful
institution is the thesis of this article.

I.

ANCIENT HISTORY

At common law, rents were classified and distinguished
according to the method of their creation. There were
three types of rent-rent service, rent charge, and rent
seck. If tenure existed between the owner of the rent and
the tenant, and the rent was incident to that tenure, the
rent was a rent service. Before the statute of Quia Emptores was passed in 1290,6 it was possible and customary to
"MAYES, GRouND RENTS IN MARYLAND (1883), referred to hereinafter as
MAYER, op. cit. aupra. For a definition of the term ground rent and a gen-

eral discussion of ground rents in the United States, see 28 0. J. 834-879.
Usually, the term ground rent as used in Maryland refers to the rent payable to the lessor, but sometimes the reference is to the relversionary
interest. See Ogle v. Reynolds, 75 Md. 145, 23 A. 137 (1891).
' Hearn, Those Row Houses and Ground Rents, Baltimore Sunday Sun,
December 19, 1937, Mag. See. pp. 5, 7.
' Baltimore's red rows and white steps have perhaps gained more fame

than have the row houses of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia by reason

of the fact that they line the streets along which pass most of the New
York and Philadelphia to Washington (and vice versa) traffic and also

because they are almost all of the same color and pattern.

'Iewis, The Tamatio of Maryland Ground Rents (1939) 3 Md. L. Rev.
314.
' 18 Edward I, c. I (1290).
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create tenure by a conveyance of land in fee as well as by
the conveyance of a lesser estate. And so before 1290,
whenever land was granted to a tenant with rent reserved,
the tenant owed his rent along with the performance of
the other feudal duties that encumbered his tenure.
One way for the lord to enforce the obligations of this
tenure was to exercise the right of distress and distrain
upon the chattels found upon the tenant's land. This
method was open to every landlord, since before Quia
Emptores, the right of distress was either incident to the
right of seignory retained by a lord when he granted in
fee, or incident to the reversion retained by a lord when he
granted estates of terms of less than fee. However, when
the lord granted away his seignory or reversion and kept
his rent, or vice versa, tenure ceased to exist between the
owner of the rent and the tenant; and the owner of the rent,
having neither a right of seignory nor a reversion in the
land, found himself possessed of only a dry rent called a
rent seck which he could not enforce by way of distress,
unless the right of distress had been expressly reserved.
A rent seck could also be created by a landowner who
retained his ownership but granted away a rent on his land.
Since no tenure was created between the owner and the
grantee of the rent, the latter did not obtain the right of
distress. The right of distress could, however, be expressly granted by the owner, and if it were so granted the
rent created was termed a rent charge.
After Quia Emptores was passed, the reservation of a
rent on a fee conveyance was no longer incident to any
tenure, for no tenure was created by the conveyance.
Therefore, such a rent was only a rent seck unless, by
reason of the express inclusion of a right of distress in its
7
terms, it was made a rent charge.
7 Rent charges are today quite common In England where they are sometimes granted by the purchaser of land in part payment and where they
are also used n family settlements to provide for younger sons. They are
seldom seen in the United States. In effect they are merely annuities.
For an example of a rent charge created in Maryland in 1861 and redeemed
within five years under the terms of the grant, see Land Records in Balti-
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However, all rents reserved in conveyances of estates
of less than fee continued to be rent services, and it would
therefore seem that present day rents reserved on terms
for years would be rent services. 8 Thus, Maryland ground
rents, which are reserved on terms of ninety-nine years
renewable forever, are rent services.9 In contrast, Pennsylvania ground rents which are reserved in fee conveyances would at first glance appear to be rents seck or rent
charges. Actually, however, since Quia Emptores has
never been in force in Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania ground
rents, like their Maryland relatives, are rent services. 10
more City, Liber G. E. S. 211, folio 228, (discussed in Mullen, Some Aspecta
of Ground Rent Law (1940) Baltimore Daily Record, September 28, 1940).
For a discussion of the three types of rent, see 3 TIFFANY, REAL PRoPmTr (3rd ed. 1939) Sec. 878; 1 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1939)
See. 276-8; 28 C. J. 835-837.
8 TPNFKY, toc. cit. supra, n. 7 and cases there cited show that the weight
of authority so holds. But the Illinois court in Penny v. Little, 4 11. 301
(1841) and the Colorado court in Herr v. Johnson, 11 Col. 393, 18 Pac. 342
(1888) have taken a contrary position basing their view on a statement
by Coke that rent service gained its appellation "because it hath some corporeal service incident to it, which at least Is fealty" (Co. Littleton 142a).
Remarking that fealty is non-existent today, these two courts have held
rent service to be non-existent. This seems clearly wrong since in the time
of Coke, rent service was one of the possible incidents of feudal tenure and
so naturally was accompanied by fealty, which was an indispensable and
ever-present incident of feudal tenure. But rent service was Itself a feudal
service and was not a service merely because it always existed side by side
with fealty.
9 Ehrman v. Mayer, 57 Md. 612 (1881). M~AYMv,
op. cit. 8upra n. 2, 15,
63, 75 ff. Whether or not a rent is a rent service is Involved in determining whether a rent has been apportioned or extinguished and also in
regard to the existence of the right of distress. It has been said that since
Maryland ground rents are rent services, Quia Emptores Is not in force in
Maryland. Mullen, Some Aspects of Ground Rent Law, Baltimore Daily
Record, September 28, 1940. It is submitted that this statement is based
on the opinion that Quia Emptores abolished feudal tenures. It would
seem, however, that It only abolished tenure between the transferor
and transferee of a fee simple estate; it did not abolish the tenurial relationship between the grantee and grantor of a lesser estate than the
grantor possessed. Powell, Determinable Fees (1923) 23 Col. L. Rev. 207.
10 Charles II granted to William Penn the power to grant land to be held
of himself immediately and mediately of the Crown, Quia Emptores notwithstanding. The Charter for the Province of Pennsylvania (1681) ; see
5 THoRp, AmECwcA CHARTERS, CONSTITUTONS, AND OG
oAlo LAws (1909)
8042.
Quta Emptores has been held not in force in the State of Pennsylvania.
Ingersoll v. Sergeant, 1 Whart. 337 (Pa. 1836) where rent reserved on a
fee conveyance was said to be rent service and so apportlonable. But see
Wallace v. Harmstad, 44 Pa. 492 (183) where It was stated that tenure
was non-existent in Pennsylvania, but that a ground rent was a rent
service. This case has been severely criticized on the ground that rent
service can not exist independently of tenure. GuY, Rura AGAXNST PEpwrunms (3rd ed. 1914) sec. 26, CADwAyL-A,
GnouiND RgTs ri PzNisyLvANiq
(1879) Ch. 1, Sec. 188. See also 14 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law
(2d ed. 1900) 1121-1122.
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On June 20, 1632, Charles I granted to Cecilius Calvert,
Lord Baltimore, the charter of Maryland."' By this
charter, Calvert and his heirs and *assigns were given as
much authority as the Bishop of Durham had ever enjoyed
within the County Palatine of Durham. 12
Among the powers specifically granted by the charter
to Baltimore was the authority to grant lands in fee, in tail,
or in any term he desired and to have the grantees hold
immediately of himself as lord and mediately of the King.
That is, Quia Emptores was not to apply to the proprietary
and his immediate grantees, but it was not superseded
altogether. However, it has been contended that the grant
to Calvert in the charter totally exempted the colony from
the operation of Quia Emptores and that that statute never
became part of the law of Maryland.13 At any rate, it is
certainly clear that it did not apply to the proprietary's
grants to his immediate grantees and that is the important
point here.
Baltimore and his heirs and assigns became tenants in
fee, under the charter, holding in common socage (or
agricultural tenure), subject only to the payment of two
Indian arrows every year and one-fifth of all the gold and
4
silver found in the colony.'
Baltimore encouraged immigration to his new colony.
He established a Land Office, which became the principal
department of the proprietary government and through
which all grants from the proprietary or later from the
"'The Charter of Maryland (1632); see 3 THORPE, AmMICAN CHARTERS,
CONSTITUTIONS, AND Owsino LAWS (1909) 1677; MAR"LAND MANUAL

(1929) 336.

12A county palatine was so-called because Its sovereign lord enjoyed
within his palatinate tie royal rights of a king within his palace. See 1
Bouvims' LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914) 694
is Hartogensis, Maryland Statutory Modifications of the Common Law of
Real Property (1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 238. But see MAYzz, op. cit. supra, 47,
48. The section of the charter in which the Quia Emptores exemption
appears is Art. 18. The Charter of Maryland: see S THom'u, AMEmCAl
CHARTERS,
CONSTITUTIONs, AND ORGANiC LAWS (1909) 1684.
1
SThe Charter of Maryland (1632) Art. 5; see 3 THifoRP, AMNE WC
CHAriES, CONSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIc LAws (1909) 1679.
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State were issued. 1 5 The proprietary at first granted only
in fee, reserving to himself, his heirs, and assigns quit rents
to be perpetually paid by the tenant and his heirs and
assigns, annually or semi-annually, in acknowledgment of
his tenancy and possibly also in lieu of taxation. A quit
rent, according to the original English usage, was a term
meaning a fixed sum of money reserved as a substitute for
all indefinite services due by the tenant to the lord, since
after he had paid it, the tenant was quit from all feudal
services except fealty. 16
The very early quit-rents were payable in wheat or
tobacco, although later on they were also payable in
money. The Calverts continued to grant lands up to the
Revolutionary War. The grants, as in the beginning, were
usually in fee but were sometimes for 99 years minus the
now familiar covenant for perpetual renewal. Land
Office records of such 99 year leases show that they existed
at least as early as 1742 and 1744.17
These were not, however, true ground rent leases
as they created only ninety-nine year terms and did not
set up perpetual leaseholds. At the outbreak of the
Revolutionary War, a convention of the people of Maryland took over the Government, ousted the proprietary,
and abolished quit rents and all feudal rights of the proprietary leaving the immediate proprietary lessees the owners
of fee simple property unencumbered by any rent."' This
action was confirmed by the Declaration of Rights of
1776,11 and by an act of the General Assembly in 1780.20 It
has been estimated that the annual value of quit rents to
the proprietary at the time of the Revolution was 30,000
pounds. However, as the quit rents were part of the proprietary's own personal estate and he was not required to
1"

MAYER, op. cit. supra, n. 2, 14, 15.

16 See 2 BouviER's LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914) 2786.
17 Jira, Baltimore Real Estate News, September 1932, Vol. 1, No. 14, p. 2;
Republished February 1933, Vol. 3, No. 2; MAYER, op. cit. supra n. 2, 28.
1s MAYER, op. cit. 8upra n. 2, 36-38.
1Constitution
of Maryland (1776), Declaration of Rights, Art. 3; see 3
THORPE, AwIuCAN CHARTEas, CONSTITUTxONS, AND ORGANic LAWS (1909)
1686, 1687.
20 Md. Laws 1780, ch. 18; MAYER, OP. Cit. supra n. 2. 37.
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keep any public records of them, this figure may be very
21
inaccurate.
So after the Revolution, quit rents had disappeared in
Maryland. But for some years previous to the Revolution,
many large landowners had leased various sized strips of
their holdings for long periods, just as the proprietary himself had occasionally, during the later colonial days,
granted land for ninety-nine year periods. Gradually
there grew up a system of annual rents and sub-rents re22
served on leases for ninety-nine years renewable forever.
These rents, known as ground rents were retained after
quit rents were extinguished and were used more and
more as time went on in Baltimore and to a lesser extent
in the adjacent counties and in the other towns of Mary23
land.
The earliest ground rent leases on record are the Harrison leases executed about 1750 and the Fell leases executed shortly thereafter. 24 The form of these two sets of
leases differs materially in only one respect-the covenant
for renewal in the Fell leases is better phrased. A glance
at a modern day ground rent lease will indicate that the
present-day ground rent leases are substantially the same
as the Fell leases.
Now from where did this system of ninety-nine year
leases renewable forever come? It is probably impossible
to give an entirely accurate answer to that question
though a thorough investigation of the discussion of the
21 Ground Rents in Baltimore, 6th Annual Report of the Bureau of Industrial Statistics for Maryland (for 1897). 83. But see 1 MCMAHON,
HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF MARYLAND

(1831)

192, putting the

Income at a smaller figure. See also, MAYER, op. cit. supra n. 2, 36.
22 There are also records of leases for 9,999 years, or longer, renewable
forever. These are treated just like 99 year leases renewable forever.
MAYER, op. cit. supra n. 2, 134. See Ward v. Newbold, 115 Md. 689, 81 A.
793, A. C. 1913A 919 (1911) where the court held that a "ground rent" does
not necessarily always mean a rent reserved under a lease for 99 years
renewable forever. It therefore refused to grant specific performance of a
leasing arrangement using the term "ground rent" but silent on the length
of the term, stating that it was lacking in definiteness.
22 For an explanation of the objectives in the minds of the early creators
of ground rent leases, see pi). 13-14, infra.
2, MAYER, op. cit. supra n. 2, 49, 50.
Apparently, a 1769 Fell lease was
involved in Myers v. Siljacks, 58 Md. 319 (1882) and a 1772 Fell lease in
Banks v. HaskIe, 45 Md. 207 (1876).
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Court of Appeals in Banks v. Haskie,2 5 and an examination
of the English and Irish cases cited therein will throw some
light on the subject.
Ninety-nine year leases without covenants for renewal
were customary in England. Mayer points out that the
lease for a long term of years first grew into prominence in
England after the passage of Quia Emptores. 26 As noted
before, 27 the ninety-nine year lease minus a covenant for
renewal was also used by the Maryland proprietary in leasing a few of his manors and reserved lands.
Sometimes the English leases for ninety-nine years included covenants for renewal. This was rarely the case,
but even if they were included, the English courts were
extremely reluctant to enforce them unless they were
clearly expressed.2 8 One of the best examples of an English court's dodging and squirming to avoid construing a
ninety-eight year Irish lease to include a covenant for renewal is the opinion of the House of Lords in Brown v.
Tighe.2" In that case, the Lord Chancellor interpreted a
rather clear covenant for renewal as a covenant for further
assurance. In so doing, he traced the historical dislike of
the English courts for covenants of renewal and took pains
to show how rare such covenants were in England. He
admitted the existence of many perpetual leases in Manchester but remarked that "there is hardly any renewal
in it; it is at once by its original construction a perpetual
lease, an interest resembling the Scotch feu for a fixed
rent."80 The Maryland Court in Banks v. Haskie further
explained that the Manchester leases though perpetual, are
perpetual by reason of the term of the original lease and
not because of any covenant of renewal in favor of the
1
grantee3
2545 Md. 207 (1876).
'a MAY, op. cit. supra n. 2, 48.
" upra circa n. 16.
" MAYza, op. cit. supra n. 2, 43.
' Brown v. Tighe, 8 Bligh N. S. 272 (1834), cited and discussed in Banks
v. Haskle, 45 Md. 207, 219, 220 (1876).
"°8 Bligh N. S. 272, 299 (1834). The Scotch feu Is a type of tenure

whereby the tenant pays In grain or money.
(8th ect. 1914), 1211.
145 Md. 207, 219 (1876).

1 Bouvma's LAw DrcToNqAY
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In Banks v. Haskie, the question before the court was
whether a court of equity could properly grant relief to a
lessee who had failed to exercise his option to renew a
ninety-nine year lease renewable forever within the
ninety-nine year period, but who had applied for equitable
relief within a reasonable time after the expiration of the
original term. The Court, holding there had been no
gross laches, decreed a renewal on payment of the renewal
fine, together with back rent due under the lease.32 The
Court also perpetually enjoined the prosecution of the
ejectment proceedings which the lessor had instituted before the beginning of the equity suit. Miller, J., in rendering the opinion, said:3 8
". .. It seems to us quite clear that the intention
was on the part of the lessor to secure the prompt payment in perpetuity of the interest on a sum of money,
equivalent to the value of the property in fee, at the
time the lease was made, and on the part of the lessee
to acquire a perpetual interest in the leased premises,
which would justify his making permanent improvements therein, and enable him to avail himself of the
value of the property thus enhanced, as well as of its
increase in value arising from other causes. ... The
owner of a vacant ground in a town located and about
to be built up, from which he can derive in its then
condition no adequate income, being himself unable
or unwilling to erect the necessary buildings, instead
of selling the property in fee for its then value and investing the proceeds in securities, or raising by mortgage the money to make the improvement himself,
resorts to this method of deriving an income from it
and making a secure and permanent investment of its
value in the land itself. He makes a lease of it by
which he secures the erection of improvements, which
enhance the value of his property, and consequently
make a permanent and safe investment of its actual
"See relief being denied in Myers v. SilJacks, 58 Md. 319 (1882) because
of delay and other factors. See laches as a bar in A. S. Abell Co. v. Fireman's Insurance Co., 93 Md. 596, 49 A. 334 (1901).
See also, Note, Lessee'a
Failure to Give Notice to Renew (1923) 27 A. L. R. 981, 991, stating that
the Maryland Court has distinguished between mere neglect and wilful
neglect or refusal to renew.
"45 Md. 207, 217 (1876).
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market value, and this is all he had in view or intended
to accomplish. 4 The lessee is encouraged to spend his
money in improvements by the permanency of the interest he acquires and expectation of further increase
in value, which will enable him also to realize a profit
from the expenditure of his means. Thus a mutual
advantage was contemplated by both parties at the
time, and the result has usually been beneficial to
both .... "
Judge Miller went on to point out that the value of
leaseholds fluctuated and often increased greatly due to
the growth of the city and/or to the extensive and costly
improvements usually made by the leasehold owners; and
that therefore under the particular circumstances of the
case, it would be only just for equity to grant relief to a
party who having spent money for improvements or who
having purchased the leasehold at its present value,
neglected through forgetfullness to secure a renewal of the
lease before the end of the ninety-nine year term.
The Maryland Court in its long and detailed analysis
gave a great deal of weight to the Irish court's treatment
of the ninety-nine year Irish agricultural leases, determinable on three lives3 5 in being at the time the lease was executed, and renewable forever on the fall of every life,
such renewal being contingent on the payment of a specified renewal fine, which was one year's rent, just as it was
in the Harrison and Fell leases.
Judge Miller reviewed the English and Irish authorities showing that the English House of Lords had reversed
the Irish courts in several cases 6 where the latter had decreed renewals after the periods specified for renewal had
",The lease in Banks v. Haskie included a covenant by the lessee to build
a house of specified description within two years of the commencement
of the demise and also a covenant to keep the house in a state of repair.
Such covenants are sometimes seen in Maryland ground rent leases, but
are not essential to the ground rent leasing arrangement.
81 Three lives in being was the rough equivalent of the life-expectancies
of three men in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See .11AYE, op.
cit. supra n. 2, 45.
30 Kane v. Hamilton, 1 Ridgway
P. C. 11% (1784): Bateman v. Murray,
1 Ridgway P. C. 187 (1785).
For a discussion of these and other English
and Irish cases, see Note, Lesee's Failure to Give Notice to Renew (1923)
27 A. L. R. 981, 997-1000.

19401

GROUND RENTS

elapsed. The reversals created such a stir in Ireland that
the Irish Parliament passed the Irish Tenantry Act37
which provided for relief for the tenant in the absence of
fraud. Then, in Boyle v. Lisacht, 8 the Irish House of
Lords, having been given back its appellate jurisdiction,
granted relief to a tenant whose position was almost the
same as that of the leaseholder in Banks v. Haskie.
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on Boyle v.
Lisacht, and quoted the Irish court as stating that the Irish
system of long term agricultural leases "has prevailed
since the time of the Great Earl of Ormond"9 who, in
order to people his vast estates . . . , and to invite a respectable and improving tenantry, produced this tenure:
it had the effect he desired; and in the nature of things
these leases have a tendency to create a respectable and
improving tenantry. It obtained, till it had acquired these
tenants, great respect, and very valuable properties, inasmuch as they were considered to have a perpetual
' '40
interest.
It might well be noted that the Earl of Ormond's
reasons for creating the long term leases were the same as
the original Lord Baltimore had in mind when he established his quit rent plan in Maryland. Mayer thought that
the strong point of resemblance between the Maryland
ground rents and the Irish leases was that they both included covenants for renewal and that otherwise "they
""19 and 20 Geo. 111, c. 30. The Maryland Court in Banks v. Haskie,
45 Md. 207, 221 (1876) said that "soon after the decision in Bateman v.
Murray, it was seen its effects would be so disastrous upon the interests of
Irish tenants that Parliament [Irish] interfered and passed the Irish
Tenancy [Tenantry] Act." But note that that Act was passed in 1779
while the final decision in Bateman v. Murray, in which Lord Thurlow
reversed the Irish court was in 1785.
38 1 Ridgway Ir. P. C. 384; 1 Vern and Scriv. 135 (1787). The Court of
Appeals stated in Banks v. Haskie. 45 Md. 207, 221 (1876) that the Irish
Lords were given back their appellate jurisdiction in 1787. but it would
seem that this jurisdiction was returned to them in 1783 by the Irish
Appeals Act, 23 Geo. III, c. 28.
39 This Ormond was probably James Butler, Twelfth Earl and First
Duke of Ormond (1610-1688).
See BURGHCL
, LIFE OF THE DUKE OF
O MOND (1912).
40 Italics by the Maryland court quoting Boyle v. Lisacht, 1 Ir. P. C. 384.
1 Vern and Scriv. 135, 143 (1787) in Banks v. Haskie, 45 Md. 207, 222
(1876).
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He goes on to

speculate:

"These Irish leases were possibly not unknown to
the Maryland rawyers of the last century, some of
whom were natives of Ireland and others . . . had
been students of law .. . at the Inns of Court, Lon-

don. They were necessarily familiar with the English
and Irish long leases and the leases for three lives
in use in the province. Consequently, out of these
old-world customs, by a process of legal selection, was
evolved the lease for the certain term (carved out of
a round century) of 99 years (equivalent to the average length of three lives in succession), renewable
forever, shorn of its collateral determinations, and retaining only the renewal fine-one year's rent-the
same in amount as the alienation fine due the proprietary by virtue of his grants, the fine reserved to him
for license to assign in his long leases, the fine paid
to the Irish landlord on the fall of each life, and the
heriot exacted by the lord of a manor on the death
of a freeholder."
Mayer also points out that it was the object of the landowners in Maryland around the time of the Revolution to
create permanent rents with the advantage of being rent
services and that this scheme was probably suggested by
the proprietary's quit rents."3
It is submitted that it is mere speculation to state that
the Maryland ground rent system either grew out of the
quit rent system or was patterned after the Irish agricultural leases. It probably evolved out of both. 4 To the
extent that the Maryland Court gives effect to Irish precedents the connecting links between the Irish and Maryland
systems are important. Otherwise, the problem of determinating the origin of the ground rent system is of little
legal relevance.
" MAYu,
op. cit. supro, n. 2, 45.
42 ibid.
,I Ibid, 46.
"But see Hollander v. Central Metal Co., 109 Md. 131, 140, 71 A. 442,
23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1135 (1908) where counsel argued: "In Ireland, from
which our ground rent system was taken, ... ." This seems like a very
doubtful proposition.
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But because the problem is fascinating, it might not be
entirely fruitless to speculate that the clause in the Maryland charter4 5 exempting the proprietary and his immediate grantees from the operation of Quia Emptores
prompted the proprietary to grant land in fee subject to
perpetual quit rents, and that in later years large Maryland landowners, knowing of the profits the quit rent
system yielded for the proprietary, searched around for a
way to retain the benefits of tenure by avoiding Quia
Emptores, and at the same time reserve for themselves
perpetual rents. They did not have to look very far, for
the proprietary himself in later colonial days had employed the ninety-nine year lease, though without a covenant for renewal.46 It would seem to have been natural
for the large landowners to have used this ninety-nine
year device of the proprietary in order to avoid Quia
Emptores, and not unnatural for them to have used the
covenant for renewal in order to obtain the perpetual
element present in the quit-rent system, for such covenants, known to the Irish land-law, were one of the few
common law precedents for perpetual leases."7
Exactly where the ground rent system came from and
exactly why it happened to perch itself in Baltimore and
the adjoining counties will probably never be completely
known, though there is hardly enough evidence to conclude that so basically attractive a system as now exists in
and around Baltimore "just sort of began" in Maryland
and evolved into its present form."8
"45The Charter of Maryland (1632), Art 18; see 3 THORprE, A
CHAsS, CoNSTITUIrxoN , AND OnAoic LAWS (1909) 1684.
"Supra, circa n. 16.

m cI N

"For reference to the "ground annual" of the Scotch law, perpetual
land charges in Continental Europe, and the perpetual rent charge or
the emphyteusis of the Roman Law, see Chief Judge Bond, concurring in
Silberstein v. Epstein, 146 Md. 254, 259, 260, 126 A. 74, 75, 76 (1924)
and citations there included. See also MAYES, op. cit. supra n. 2, 17, 18.

"$A very nteresting and somewhat unorthodox explanation of the origin
of the 99 year lease is given by E. H. Brenner of Omaha, Nebraska, once
a member of the Executive Committee of the National Association of

Building Owners and Managers.

Brenner's observations were set forth

in the Building Owner's and Manager's Bulletin and were commented on

in the November, 1928 San Francisco Real Estate Circular in an editorial

entitled Lo,n Term Lea8es. Brenner was apparently prompted to set
forth his views after reading a St. Louis Bulletin Newspaper excerpt on
an article from the Pathfinder Magazine which stated that "the cu-
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The form of the modern ground rent lease is only
slightly different from that used in the eighteenth century.
What were the original objects of the creators of those
leases? The Court of Appeals in Banks v. Haskie has said
the object on the part of the lessees was to secure a perpetual tenancy and the object on the part of the lessors
was to obtain a valuable, long term, safe investment. 9
Present day creators of ground rents have very much
the same ideas in mind. Grantors of ground rent leases
either plan to retain the ground rents as investments or
sell them to other investors, while lessees, who today buy
subject to ground rents, are still greatly interested in
acquiring perpetual interests in property which will justify
their making improvements. However, it is definitely
necessary to note that the underlying philosophy of both
lessors and lessees has been greatly affected by the Redemption Acts, the first of which was passed in 1884.50 As
a result of these acts which make it possible for a lessee
tom of making leases for 99 years is a relic of the old English feudal
system." Brenner, in an answer to this statement, claimed that the custom dated back to Biblical times and quoted the 25th chapter of Leviticus
to substantiate his claim: "And ye shall hallow the 50th year and proclaim liberty throughout the land and unto all the inhabitants thereof; it shall be a jubilee unto you and ye shall return every man unto
his possessions and ye shall return every man unto his family, a jubilee
shall that 50th year be unto you." Another portion of the Mosaic law
pertaining to resumption of ownership of land states: "In this year of
jubilee ye shall return every man unto his own possessions . . . and the
land shall not be sold in perpetuity for the land is mine; for ye are
strangers and sojourners with me . . . That which he hath sold shall
remain In the hand of him that hath bought it until the year of jubilee;
and in the year of jubilee it shall grant, and he shall return unto his
possessions."
Brenner, commenting on the Biblical land law, observed: "...
This
law of Moses, therefore, allowed 49 year leases of property to be made
and it was a common practice when leases were made to have them
made for the full term of 49 years or for the remaining years until
the jubilee. In this way there was built up a land tenure of 49 years
because the 50th year was a free year. This was later extended to 99
years and more recently to 999 years. This, I think, was the real beginning of the custom of leasing property for a period of years and was
the origin of 99 year leases."
'0 Banks v. Haskle, 45 Md. 207, 217 (1876) quoted supra circa n. 33. See
also Myers v. SilJacks, 58 Md. 319, 329, 330 (1882) ; Collins v. McTavish,
63 Md. 166 (1884).
50 Md. Laws 1884, Ch. 485. The Redemption Laws are codified in Md.
Code (1939) Art. 21, Secs. 110, 111; Art. 53, Sec. 25 of Md. Code (1924)
was repealed by Md. Laws 1929, Ch. 361.
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to pay off his ground rent after five years, the lessor can
no longer be certain that he will have a long term or perpetual investment. On the other hand, the lessee can buy
subject to a ground rent knowing that if he ever has
the money to purchase his lessor's reversionary interest,
he will have the opportunity to do so.
Still, despite the fact that the ground rent system is
somewhat different in 1940 than it was in 1750, the covenants in the modern ground rent lease are substantially
the same as they were in 1750, and have been given, for
the most part, uniform interpretation ever since that time.
With that in mind, an examination of the various covenants in a typical ground rent lease now in use in Baltimore will help to exhibit the details of the relationship
between the lessor and the lessee of a ground rent conveyance.
Under such a lease, the lessor grants to the lessee, his
executors, administrators, and assigns a specifically
described lot along with the improvements on that lot and
all rights and appurtenances connected with it for a term
of ninety-nine years.
The lessee covenants in return for himself, his executors, administrators, and assigns to pay a specified yearly
rental during the running of the lease in equal semi-annual
installments and also agrees to pay all the taxes and
assessments on the leased property.
o The lessor is given the right to distrain all chattels
found upon the premises at any time the rents shall be
wholly or partially in arrear.5 1 If any rent is unpaid
either in whole or in part for sixty days, the lessor can,
if he wishes, take over the premises by re-entry and hold
them until all back rent is paid up. And if any part of the
rent is in arrear for six months, the lessor may re-enter
the leased premises and possess them again as he did before the lease; that is, he can take over the property and
consider the lease null and void. Indeed, he can hold the
al The right of distraint in Maryland is much the same today, with
a few exceptions, as it was at the common law. Hartogensis, Maryland
Statutory Modifications of the Comoon Law of Real Property (1937)
1 Md. L. Rev. 243. See also MAYER, Op. cit. supra n. 2, 99-101.
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property as if the lease had never been made. However,
by complying with the provisions of an act of the legislature of 1872, as amended in 1929, the lessee may obtain
relief in equity, by filing a bill within six months after
execution.

52

The lessor, for himself, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns also covenants that in return for performance by the lessee he will warrant the leased premises
against all persons claiming by or through the lessor, his
heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns.5" He likewise
covenants on his and their behalf to renew the lease any
time during its ninety-nine year term at the request of the
lessee, his representatives, or his assigns on payment by
him or by them of from One to Ten Dollars as a renewal
fine. It is specified in the lease, however, that the lessee
shall have no right to demand renewal of any lease forfeited for non-payment of the rent. But otherwise, the
lessee can at any time during the ninety-nine year period
secure another lease for an additional ninety-nine years,
to begin on the expiration of the first lease, with the same
rent and with the same covenants, "so that the demise
hereby created may be renewable and renewed as to such
lot or lots respectively from time to time forever.""
52 Md. Laws 1872, Ch. 346, codified as Md. Code (1939) Art. 75, Sec.
78, which re-enacted the substance of 4 Geo. II, c. 28, sec. 2 and added
certain improvements. See ALEXANDR, BRIsH STATUTES IN FoRcE IN
MARYLAND (2d ed. 1912) 950. See also 2 PoE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (5th
Ed. 1925) Sec. 493. That statute was passed in England after English
courts of both law and equity had instituted and carried out a discretionary practice of staying ejectment proceedings by lessors for periods which they considered Just periods of postponement of forfeiture.
MAYER, op. cit. supra n. 2, 101-105; Watts, Maryland Ground Rents and Their
Collection, Baltimore Real Estate News, August, 1931, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 3.

Note that under the statute of 1872 if the lessee defaults, a leasehold
mortgagee can come in within six months, and become the lessee by doing what the lessee covenanted to do.
That statute applied to all leases. Campbell v. Sidley, 41 Md. 81, 93
(1874).
It was repealed and re-enacted by Md. Laws 1929, Ch. 406
and codified as Md. Code (1939) Art. 75, Sec. 78.
58The ground rent covenant for title is a covenant of special warranty
as contrasted with a covenant of general warranty by which the covenantee is guaranteed against the claims of all persons whomsoever. See
4 TIFFANY, RAL PsoPrTzr (3rd ed. 1939) Sec. 999.
56 For a more detailed discussion of the form of the ground rent lease,
see MAYER, op. cit. 8upra n. 2, 51 if. Fo1 further treatment of the lessor's
opportunities for relief and for a showing of the many difficulties in a
lessor's path, see Cameron, Procedurefor the Collectton of Ground Rensm
in Maryland, Baltimore Daily Record, August 15, 1934.
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PERPETUAL ASPECTS AND THE RuLE AGAINST

PERPETuJIES
The basic, fundamental covenant of the ground rent
lease-the one that really distinguishes it from the ordinary long term lease-is the covenant by the lessor to
renew the lease on the same, identical terms at any time
during the original term on request of the lessee. It would
appear from a reading of the lease that unless the lessee
exercised his option to renew and paid the specified renewal fine at some time before the expiration of the first
ninety-nine year term, he would stand to forfeit his leasehold interest and thereby lose its market value, which
would of course include the value of the improvements he
had added to the premises. And indeed such was the
situation before 1886, subject to the possibility that a court
of equity would give the relief afforded in Banks v.
55
Haskie.
But in 1886, the legislature passed the following act:
"Whenever the lessee or lessees named in any lease
or sub-lease containing a covenant for perpetual renewal, or any person or persons claiming under such
lessee or lessees shall have retained or shall retain
uninterrupted possession of the demised premises, or
any part thereof, for twelve months after the expiration of such lease or sub-lease, it shall be conclusively
presumed in reference to the whole or any part or
parts of said demised premises, whereof possession
shall have been retained as aforesaid, and in favor of
said lessee, lessees, or of the person or persons
claiming under such lessee or lessees, that a new
lease or sub-lease of the whole of said demised
premises was executed prior to the expiration
of said lease or sub-lease by the lessor or lessors
therein named, or persons rightfully claiming under
such lessor or lessors to the said lessee or lessees, for
such additional term; under such rent and upon such
covenants, conditions and stipulations as were provided in said lease or sub-lease." 6
5545 Md. 207 (1876) and discussion, supra cerca notes 25-33.
O"Md. Laws 1886, Ch. 154, codified as Md. Code (1989) Art. 21, See. 113.
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Thus, except for the lessee's statutory right of redemption,
all leasehold estates whether created before or after the
passage of this act have, since 1886, been practically perpetual interests. Indeed, most investors and real estate
men think of a leasehold as a perpetual estate and a ground
rent as a perpetual investment which can be "called in"
by redemption.57 In fact, renewal fines are rarely paid
though it would seem at least somewhat doubtful whether
the act of 1886 was either intended to or could constitutionally do away with the provisions requiring these payments
in the event of renewal, at least in regard to leases executed before 1886. However, since the sums involved
would be so small there will hardly be any litigation concerning renewal fines.
As a result of this statute, lessees who pay their rent
during the hundredth year are protected. Likewise,
lessees challenged by their landlords at the end of the
original ninety-nine year period would seem to be able
to secure automatic renewal under the statute by paying
the hundredth year's rent. However, it is well to note
that this 1886 act has never been litigated in the Court of
Appeals and that the written language of the law itself
is the only -authority in connection with it.
A possible problem that may arise in connection with
the statute concerns the unfortunate lessee who, unable
37 "The covenant of the reversioner is that the tenant and his representatives may hold, occupy, and enjoy the land through all future time,
provided they pay the stipulated rent. If they continue to pay the rent
and elect to hold the premises by renewals of the lease, the reversioner
can never, under any circumstances obtain possession of the demised
premises." Crowe v. Wilson, 65 Md. 479, 482, 5 A. 427, 428, 57 A. R.
343, 344, 345 (1886) (Italics supplied).
A lease for 99 years renewable forever creates an interest "coextensive
with the fee itself in duration . . ." (Culbreth v. Smith, 69 Md. 450, 459,
16 A. 112, 116, 1 L. R. A. 538, 541 (1888).
"He (the leaseholder), his personal representatives and assigns, have
a perpetual interest in the property, which can only be affected by a
failure to pay the rent or comply with some covenant, and are entitled
to a renewal at the expiration of every ninety-nine years, on payment
of a small renewal fine. Mayor of Baltimore v. Latrobe, 101 Md. 621,
634, 61 A. 203, 207 (1905).
"The originators of the [ground rent] device had contrived a permanent ownership of the land in the one in the position of lessee, coupled
with a permanent charge or annuity in the one standing as fee simple
owner or reversioner. On both sides were to be permanent owners, one
of the land and the other of the charge." Bond, C. J., concurring in Silberstein v. Epstein, 146 Md. 254, 258, 260, 126 Atl. 74, 75, 76 (1924).
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to assign his leasehold, is forced to continue on as the
owner of property which has depreciated so badly that he
no longer possesses sufficent equity in it to justify his paying rent. And yet so long as he remains solvent, as the
owner of the leasehold he is personally liable on his covenant to pay the rent. But what if the ninety-nine year
term runs out? Our lessee of course, will be perfectly delighted to let the leasehold go by default. Why couldn't
he say: "I didn't demand a renewal lease during the running of the original term. I didn't pay rent during the ensuing twelve months and so there was no automatic statutory renewal. Since there has been no renewal, the lease
is up and I'm free?" There seems to be no good reason
why a lessee couldn't do just this, although a decision
to that effect will fly squarely in the face of the popular belief that a leasehold estate is a perpetual interest unless the
lessee chooses to redeem.
However, despite this probable exception, the 1886
statute has in effect made most leasehold interests automatically renewable and therefore perpetual since most
lessees have sufficient equity in their leaseholds to warrant
their continuing rental payments after the first ninety-nine
years are up. As a result, there are many perpetual interests in land in -Maryland. How does this square with
the Rule against Perpetuities? 58
Since 1886, there could hardly be any objection in regard to the covenant for renewal, for the legislature has
authorized automatic renewal. But what was the story
before 1886? It would seem that during the hundred or
more years of ground rent history prior to 1886, some
lessor would have refused to renew on the ground that
the covenant for renewal was void under the Rule against
Perpetutities. But as a matter of fact only a limited
amount of ground rent litigation occurred until the 1870's
because it was not until then that any number of the early
ninety-nine year terms ended, and so the perpetuity prob51 For a discussion and definition of a perpetuity and the Rule against
Perpetuities, see Graham v. Whitridge, 99 Md. 248, 57 A. 609, 58 A. 36,
66 L. R. A. 408 (1904).
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lem was never discussed by the Court before Banks v.
Haskie in 1876. In that case, the Maryland Court referred
only to the covenant for perpetual renewal and concluded
in a sentence that it did not take the property "ex commercium" and so did not violate the Rule against Perpetuities.59
Another and more serious perpetuity problem that cannot be so easily brushed aside is the validity of the lessee's
option to redeem the fee. Before 1884, though most of the
ground rents in being in Maryland were irredeemable, a
goodly number contained covenants of redemption. That
is, the lessor agreed to convey the fee to the lessee on request by the lessee at a specified time or within a specified
period on condition that the lessee would pay the amount
of the yearly rent capitalized at a certain percentage,
which was usually six per cent, the legal rate of interests °
Since 1884, each and every leaseholder holding under
a lease post-dating that year has a right to redeem by
statute and this is true even though the ordinary ground
rent lease makes no mention of the statutory option of
redemption. 1 Of course, since the modern right of redemption owes its existence to the Maryland legislature,
there can be no problem concerning its validity under the
Rule, for though the legislature did not specifically refer
to the Rule, it certainly impliedly treated the Rule as inapplicable when it required ground rents to be redeemable.
As to options to redeem in pre-1884 leases, apparently
no case involving their validity arose until 1908. Then,
5 45 Md. 207, 218 (1876), repeated and accepted in Brown v. Reeder,
108 Md. 653, 660, 71 A. 417, 420 (1908) and in accord with the great
weight of authority. See Abbott, Leases and the Rule Against Perpetuities, (1918) 27 Yale L. J. 878, 883-885; Note, Land Trusts as Methods
of Finance (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1149, 1151-1152. Prof. John Chipman Gray at one time contended that a covenant for perpetual renewal
was part of the lessee's present Interest and not a separate future contingent interest with the possibility of vesting too remotely. GRAY, THz
RULE AGAINST PEatmuTrms (1886) See. 230. But Gray later retreated
considerably. GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPLTUITIES (2d ed. 1906 and 3rd
ed. 1915) See. 230a. It would seem that until the lessee exercises his
option to renew, no additional term can be said to have vested and that
the validity of the option for renewal is a definite and justifiable exception to the Rule. Abbott, Leases and the Rule Against Perpetutiet,
supra.
60 Md. Code (1939) Art. 49, Sec. 1.
"'Md. Code (1939) Art. 21, Sees. 110, 111.
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in Hollander v. Central Metal Co.,6 2 which concerned a
covenant for redemption in an 1835 ground rent lease, the
Court of Appeals held the covenant valid. Since the redemption legislation did not affect ground rents already
in existence in 1884 the Maryland Court had before it in
that case a common law problem. Its decision coming as
it did in 1908, was of practical importance in Maryland
only in regard to the limited number of redeemable ground
rents created before 1884. However, outside of Maryland,
the holding in the case would still be extremely vital if
redeemable ground rents of the Maryland type were created without the aid of statute.63
V.

MIscELLANEOUS PROBLEMS OF THE GRoUND RENT
RELATIONSHIP

In order for a covenant in a lease to run with the land,
it must meet certain technical requirements. Since these
requirements are satisfied by the covenants which are
usual in the ordinary ground rent lease, the burdens and
"2109 Md. 131, 71 A. 442, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1135 (1908).
"The Court of Appeals, In sustaining the validity of the covenant
for redemption in the Hollander case, emphasized the commercial importance of the ground rent system and the liberal judicial attitude
adopted In connection with the system in order to retain its benefits.
The Court discussed and relied on Banks v. Haskle, 45 Md. 207 (1876),
Myers v. Siljacks, 58 Md. 319 (1882), and Worthington v. Lee, 61 Md.
530 (1884).
In his discussion of options in leases for terms for years by which
lessees have the right to buy out their lessor's reversionary interest,
Gray stated that such options when exercised at a remote time were
invalid. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3rd ed. 1914) Sec.
230b, distinguishing the Hollander case in n. 2 to See. 230b as based on local
law. All the cases Gray cited in favor of his proposition were English
cases. The English rule is still as Gray indicated it was in 1914. Abbott,
Leases and the Rule against Perpetuities (1918) 27 Yale L. J. 878, 888;
Note: Land Trusts as Methods of Finance (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1149,
1150, n. 22. But the American law Is in accord with Hollander v. Central
Metal Co. Abbott, Leases and the Rule Against Perpetuities,supra; Note,
Land Trusts as Methods of Finance, supra. The American rule would
seem to be the better one. The English courts have failed to distinguish
between options in gross which are threats to continued possession and
clogs on alienability; and options in leases to purchase the fee which
encourage the tenant to develop and improve his interest in the land.
But see Note, Options to purchase and the rule against undue suspension of the power of alienation, L. R. A. 19171), 904, 907; Note, Options
to Purchase Realty as Violating the Rule Against Perpetuities,Ann. Cas.
1916D, 577, 578, citing the Hollander case as a local rule which illustrated the tendency of the Maryland Court to keep land tenure certain.
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benefits of these leases run with the land.6
And so all
successors in title of the lessee become liable to the lessor
and his successors for performance of the covenants of the
lessee while they have the right to possession of the leasehold. Likewise, the successors of the lessor become liable
for performance of the covenants of the lessor while they
own the ground rent. However, note that the liability of
these successors exists only during the time they are connected with the ground rent or the leasehold. For example, the assignee of the original lessee is liable to the
person or persons then owning the ground rent for the
performance of the covenants of the lessee only in so far
as their performance is connected with his tenure. So,
although he must pay all the rent and taxes on the property for the time he is tenant, he is not responsible for any
defaults that have occurred before, or will occur after, his
period of tenancy. 5
In contrast, the original lessee is not only liable for
performance of his covenants to pay rent and taxes during
his tenancy, but also throughout the entire term of the
lease. For his liability growing out of privity of contract
rests on his continuing contractual liability, 6 while the
liability of his assigns arises solely from the basis of their
privity of estate and continues only so long as that privity
exists.
"Thurston v. Monke, 32 Md. 487 (1810), Hollander v. Centrad Metal
Co., 109 Md. 131, 155-157, 71 A. 442, 44, 447, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1135,
1143, 1144-1146 (1908).
See, Note: Covenants Running with the Land
(1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 320, discussing the three requirements for a covenant to run with the land which were laid down in Spencer's Case, 5
Coke 16a (1853), and the Maryland Court's treatment of these requirements. These requirements -re: (1) privity of estate must exist between
the covenantor and eovenantee; (2) both benefit and burden of the
covenant must touch and concern the land; (3) if the covenant relates
to something not in esse, then the covenant can run only if the "assigns"
are expressly designated.
In relation to the third requirement, see
Maryland and Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Silver, 110 Md. 510, 73 A. 297
(1909) discussed in the Note, supra, 1 Md. L. Rev., at 326.
65 Reid v. Wiesner Brewing Co., 88 Md. 234, 40 A. 877 (1898) ; Williams
v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 167 Md. 499, 506, 175 A. 331, 334 (1934).
16 Hintze v. Thomas, 7 Md. 346 (1855)
Lester v. Hardesty, 29 Md. 50
(1868) ; Danielson v. Polk, 64 Md. 501, 2 A. 824 (1886) ; Consumer's Ice
Co. v. Bixler, 84 Md. 437, 446, 447, 35 A. 1086, 1087 (1896); Building
Assn. v. Robinson, 90 Md. 615, 634, 45 A. 449, 455-456 (1900), Williams v.
Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 167 Md. 499, 506, 175 A. 831, 334 (1934);
MAYER, op. cit. supra, n. 2, 113-117; 28 C. J. 860, Sec. 48.
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But suppose there is a default after his death? Is his
estate just as responsible as he would have been had he
been alive? This precise question has never come up before the Court of Appeals though the general rule is that
debts of the deceased bind his estate. The problem has
however arisen in Pennsylvania where the highest court
in effect has decided that the estate of an original lessee
is only liable for defaults which have occurred during the
life-time of that lessee or during the tenancy of his executors or administrators. The Pennsylvania Court stated
that if estates of original lessees were subject to contingent
contractual liability in the event that resort to the land
proved ineffectual, final distribution of estates of original
lessees could never be made as long as the ground rent was
outstanding. The Court held that such a result was contrary to settled policy and was not intended by the original
grantee and probably not intended by the original grantor
who usually looks to the land as his real security and not
6 7
to the continuing liability of his grantee.
Of course alert lessees and their estates are not bothered by any problems of contractual liability for they customarily employ straw men to act as original lessees.
Straw men are persons of little or no means who take the
conveyance of leasehold estates and immediately assign
them to the real lessees who are legally considered assignees of the original lessee and so are exempt from contractual liability. When this method is used, the lessor
and his successors can as a practical matter look only to
liability by way of privity of estate. However, if a straw
6, Quain's

Appeal, 22 Pa. 510 (1854).
Pennsylvania ground rents are created by way of a fee conveyance
while Maryland ground rents are created by leases for years, but the
problem of the continuing liability of the grantee would seem to be the
same under both systems. In accord with Quain's Appeal, supra: Williams' Appeal, 47 Pa. 283 (1864) ; Hunt's Appeals, 105 Pa. 128 (1884) ;
Gardiner v. Painter, 3 Phila. (Pa.) 365, 16 Leg. Int. (Pa.) 141 (1859) ; 3
ELLIOT, CONTRACTS (1913) sec. 1907; 28 C. J. 873; 14 Am. and Eng. Encyc.

of Law (2d ed. 1900) 1121, 1125.

It is submitted that the Maryland Court will follow the lead of the
Pennsylvania Court if the problem is ever litigated in Maryland. See
a possible dictum in Baltimore City v. Latrobe, 101 Md. 621, 632, 633,
61 A. 203, 206 (1905).

Another interesting question is whether an original lessee, who has
assigned his leasehold interest, is discharged from this continuing contractual burden by going through bankruptcy.

24
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man should become affluent, it would seem that he would
be held liable on the basis of his contractual obligation. 8
A more serious and pressing question than the problem
of the liability of the estates of original lessees concerns
leasehold mortgagees. One of the standard covenants in
a leasehold mortgage is that the mortgagor shall pay rent
and taxes. If he fails to do so, he is in default, and since
the mortgagee upon default acquires the right to take possession of the property, he is automatically deemed by the
Maryland court to be in privity of estate with the ground
rent owner, and to have therefore become liable for future
rents and taxes.6 9 This rule has caught many unwary
mortgagees including the HOLC, who, in attempting to
help property owners with mortgages around their necks,
certainly did not intend to play "Lord Bountiful" to
numerous ground rent owners. 70 This rule has naturally
met with considerable criticism and, it is submitted, should
be changed by statute. 1
While future legislation can remove this last-mentioned
difficulty, it will take more than legislation to cure all the

11

Apparently it was once the practice for the original lessee to require
his assignee to agree to pay the rent for the duration of the lease, thus
protecting himself against his assignee's assigning to an irresponsible
person.
A similar method might be employed by lessors to prevent the use of
straw men. That is, a lessor could require his lessee to require any of
his assigns, and any assignee of his Immediate assignee, etc. to agree
to pay the rent for the duration of the term. However, of course, such
a method might not be acceptable in a community where the use of
straw men is so well established.
"Hintze v. Thomas, 7 Md. 346 (1855); Mayhew v. Hardesty, 8 Md.
479 (1855); Lester v. Hardesty, 29 Md. 50, 54 (1868) ; Judik v. Crane,
81 Md. 610, 617, 32 A. 276, 277 (1895) ; Building Assn. v. Robinson, 90
Md. 615, 618, 633, 45 A. 449, 450, 455 (1900); Gibbs v. Didier, 125 Md.
486, 492, 94 A. 100, 101 (1915); Williams v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co.,
167 Md. 499, 506, 175 A. 331, 334 (1934) ; Hart v. HOLC, 169 Md. 446, 182
A. 322 (1936) ; Jones v. Burgess, 4 A. (2d) 483 (Md. 1939) ; Lewis, The
Tawation of Maryland Ground Rents (1939) 3 Md. L. Rev. 314, 321. 322.
70 See Lewis, op. cit. 8upra n. 69, 314, 323.
71 See Ibid., 314, 322, 323, and note his reference to House Bill 61, unsuccessfully introduced Into the House of Delegates in the 1937 session.
This bill was designed to change the Maryland rule. The Pennsylvania
rule is contra, that Court holding a mortgage conveyance is for security
purposes and conveys no real interest In the property. See Wetherell v.
Hamilton, 15 Pa. 195 (1851); where the Pennsylvania Court cited and
considered two old English cases, Eaton v. Jacques, 2 Doug. 455 (1780),
and Williams v. Bosanquet, 1 Brod. and Bing 238 (1819), (which overruled the Eaton case) and then proceeded to accept the rule of the Eaton
case. The Maryland rule dates from Hintze v. Thomas, supra n. 69 and
Mayhew v. Hardesty, supra n. 69 where the Court of Appeals followed the
Bosanquet case. See 28 C. J. 861.
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possible headaches that can arise from the use of subground rents and sub-sub-rents 7which
encumber many of
2
the older down-town properties.
Sub-ground rent leases are modeled closely after the
form of original leases, though in order to keep the conveyance of a sub-leasehold from being an assignment of
the entire leasehold interest, the leaseholder must reserve
a reversion of at least one day to himself and usually he
will reserve one year. Thus most sub-leases are for
ninety-eight years renewable forever. In addition, some
of them contain covenants by the sub-lessor whereby he
agrees that if at any time during the duration of the sublease he should acquire the fee, he will on request, execute
a new original lease, as contrasted with a sub-lease. 78
Sub-rents are often used to carve out leasehold interests under one-cent original ground rents which are
quite common in Baltimore City.74 Perhaps the primary
reason for setting up these one-cent rents is to prevent the
creation of dower rights. For instance, a single man, who
is either contemplating marriage or wants to guard against
the possibility of its future occurrence, will convey the fee
to property which he owns to a friend and take in return a
leasehold estate for ninety-nine years renewable forever
subject to a one-cent ground rent in favor of his friend.
Or, take the case of a purchaser, who being married, desires to acquire an interest in land to which no dower right
in his wife will attach. He can do this easily by taking a
leasehold subject to a one-cent ground rent. In both these
cases, dower rights will not attach to the leasehold inter72 MAYER, Op. cit. supra n. 2, 58-62, 93-94.
Usually the total amount of
sub-rents on a piece of property equals the original rent reserved on it,
but sometimes that total is greater.
71 A sub-lessee is not in privity of estate with the original lessor and
so Is not liable on the covenants of the original ground rent lease. Mayhew v. Hardesty, 8 Md. 479 (1855).
For an example of a sub-lease with a covenant to convey upon request
the fee if acquired, see Swift and Co. v. Trustees of Shepard-Pratt Hospital, 13 A (2d) 174 (Md. 1940).
71 One-cent ground rents are treated exactly like other original ground
rents. Crowe v. Wilson, 65 Md. 479, 481, 5 AtI. 427, 428, 57 A. R. 343, 344

(1886).

Rents of one peppercorn were once common but these have long since
given away to one-cent ground rents.
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ests, which are characterized as chattels real and classified
as personalty and not realty.78
However, despite the fact that he legally is the mere
owner of a chattel real, practically speaking, the leaseholder under a ground rent demise owns realty which he
can hold on to as long as he lives up to the obligations of
the lease. And though as a rule, his property interest is
treated by the law as personalty, still the law sometimes
takes cognizance of the physical status of his property
interest. For instance, he must convey it by an instrument which conforms to the legal requirements for the
transfer of realty or the conveyance will not be valid. 8
On the other hand, original ground rent holders, being
reversioners in fee, own realty just as do all other persons
owning future interests in land in fee. In contrast, however, sub-rent holders do not possess realty; for sub-rents
are created out of leasehold estates, which being themselves personalty, can hardly give birth to offspring of
greater stature.

77

"At one time in the past, one-cent grounds rents were used to get
around the law forbidding aliens to own realty. This law has long since
been changed. Md. Laws 1874, Ch. 354, codified as Md. Code (1939) Art.
3, Sec. 1.
70Maryland leasehold interests are personalty. Allender v. Sussan, 33
Md. 11, 3 A. R. 171 (1870) ; Dumfrles v. Abercrombie, 46 Md. 172 (1877) ;
Taylor v. Taylor, 47 Md. 295 (1877) ; Merryman v. Long, 49 Md. 540
(1878); Arthur v. Cole, 56 Md. 100, 40 A. R. 409 (1881); Culbreth v.
Smith, 69 Md. 450, 16 A. 112, 1 L. R. A. 538 (1888) ; O'Brien v. Clark,
104 Md. 30, 64 A. 53 (1906); Craig v. Craig, 140 Md. 322, 117 A. 756
(1922). The fee interest encumbered by a Pennsylvania ground rent is
realty, and the man in the position of a Maryland leaseholder has a fee
interest. Ingersoll v. Sergeant, 1 Whart. 336, 350 (Pa. 1836). Cf. Craver's
Estate, 319 Pa. 282, 179 A. 606 (1935), where the Pennsylvania Court was
dealing with a Maryland ground rent.
Maryland leaseholds, though personalty, must be conveyed as realty.
Bratt v. Bratt, 21 Md. 578 (1864); Md. Code (1939) Art. 21, Sec. 1.
See also Md. Code (1939) Art. 26, See. 20 stipulating that all judgments and decrees of Maryland courts shall constitute liens on all leaseholds and terms for years owned by the defendants in land, except year
to year leases and terms of less than five years which are not renewable. The statute states that these liens are to have the same extent
and effect as judgment liens created upon real estate.
Under a statute providing for the assent of "the owner" of property
to the paving of a street the leaseholder, not the ground rent man, was
held to be "the owner". Holland v. Baltimore, 11 Md. 186 (1857).
"But In the case of an irredeemable ground rent . . . the owner of the
leasehold interest Is the substantial owner of the property." Baltimore
City v. Latrobe, 101 Md. 621, 634, 61 A. 203, 207 (1905).
77Maryland ground rents are realty. Coombs v. Jordan, 3 Bland 284,
22 Am. Dec. 236 (Md. 1828). Pennsylvania ground rents are also realty.
Ingersoll v. Sergeant, 1 Whart. 336, 350 (Pa. 1836).
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Though the Court of Appeals in 1876 in Banks v. Haskie
had praised the irredeemable ground rent system to the
skies,"8 a great deal of dissatisfaction gradually arose with
the system, until, in 1884, the Maryland legislature passed
several ground rent statutes, one of which materially
changed the entire ground rent system. This act was the
Redemption law of 1884 entitled "An Act to prohibit the
creation in the future of irredeemable ground rents and
to regulate the leasing of land. ' 79 It provided that all
leases created in the future for more than fifteen years
would be redeemable by the lessee at his option any time
after the expiration of fifteen years, at the rate of six per
cent, unless some other rate not exceeding four per cent
was specified in the lease.
Thus, by one act, the legislature forbade the future creation of irredeemable ground rents.8 0 No longer was it
possible to create a ground rent and sit back securely, conscious that, as a ground rent owner, one could probably
count on a definite amount of income for the rest of his
life, if the value of the leasehold held up at all decently.
On the other hand, no longer was it possible for a leaseholder to obligate himself to pay a sum twice every year
for the rest of his life or at least so long as he owned the
leasehold.
"See also Bosley v. Bosley's Exrx., 14 How. 390, 396, 14 L. Ed. 468,
470 (1852) where Mr. Chief Justice Taney praised the system.
See
n. 141, infra, for a discussion of the dissatisfaction which grew up, and
see also supra circa notes 84, ff., and 114, ff.
,, Md. Laws 1884, Ch. 485; Md. Code (1939) Art. 21, Sec. 110.
soIt may still be possible to create irredeemable rents by the use of
a rent charge mechanism. Cf. 8upra circa n. 7. An irredeemable rent
charge might be created by the conveyance by a fee simple owner of his
fee interest, reserving to himself a perpetual annual rent. Such a method
would be similar to the ground rent indenture in use in Pennsylvania,
except that such irredeemable ground rents are prohibited in Pennsylvania by statute, Pa. Code, Title 68, Sees. 161, 162. The Maryland
legislature, in abolishing irredeemable ground rents in Maryland, phrased
the language of the statute it formulated in terms of the leasehold form
of ground rent known in Maryland. Md. Code (1939) Art. 21, Secs.
110, 111. For the view that irredeemable rents created other than by
the leasehold mechanism can exist under the laws now in force in Maryland, see Mullen, Some Aspects of Ground Rent Law, Baltimore Daily
Record, September 28, 1940.
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In 1888, the legislature further revised the system by
providing that all leases and subleases of more than fifteen
years were redeemable after ten years at the option of the
tenant on six months' notice at a rate not to exceed six
per cent.s1
Another change was made in 1900 when leases of more
than fifteen years were declared redeemable after five
years at no more than six per cent.8 2
The result of these three redemption laws is that today
the following situation exists in Maryland regarding
ninety-nine year leases renewable forever:
1. All ground rents created before 1884 are irredeemable unless by their own terms they state otherwise, since
the redemption laws cannot constitutionally apply retroactively."8
2. All ground rents created between 1884 and 1888
are redeemable after fifteen years at the option of the
lessee at six per cent, unless by their terms, another rate
not exceeding four per cent is specified.
3. All ground rents created between 1888 and 1900
are redeemable after ten years at the option of the lessee
at six-per cent.
4. All ground rents created after 1900 are redeemable
after five years at the option of the lessee at six per cent. 4
Why were these statutes passed? The legislative
records of the debates which preceded their passage are
not available today and so the only official explanation of
them appears in the decisions of the courts.
'8 Md. Laws 1888, Ch. 395; Md. Code (1939)

Art. 21, Sec. 110.
81 Md. Laws 1900, Ch. 207; Md. Code (1939) Art. 21, Sec. 111.
81 See Marburg v. Mercantile Building Co., 154 Md. 438, 443, 444, 140
A. 836, 839 (1928) where it was said that if the Act of 1922 (Md. Laws
1922, Ch. 384) were to apply to leases made before it went into effect, It
would interfere with existing contractual rights and be a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
A lease executed after 1884 on request of a lessee under a ground
rent created before 1884 would be irredeemable as executed in pursuance of an agreement in the original lease. See Flook v. Hunting, 76
Md. 178, 24 A. 670 (1892) ; Jones v. Linden Building Assn., 79 Md. 73, 29
A. 76 (1894) ; Maulsby v. Page, 105 Md. 24, 65 A. 818 (1907) ; Poultney
v. Emerson, 117 Md. 655, 84 A. 53 (1912) ; Swift and Co. v. Trustees of
Shepard-Pratt Hospital, 13 A. (2d) 174, 178, 179 (Md. 1940).
8, For the present status of the Redemption Statutes of 1884, 1888,
and 1900, see Md. Code (1939) Art. 21, Secs. 110, 111.

GROUND RENTS

1940]

Stewart v. Gorter,5 which was decided in 1889 is the
first landmark case in this field. It involved a lease for
fourteen years with a covenant for perpetual renewal by
the lessor, an agreement by the lessor to allow redemption
at five per cent, and a promise by the lessee not to avail
himself of his statutory option to redeem at six per cent
under the act of 1888. The precise question before the
Court concerned performance of a leasing contract made
in 1888, after the passage of the second redemption law.
The result turned on whether the lease would be subject
to the provisions of the 1888 statute.
The Court of Appeals held that the act of 1888 applied
to the lease and that the lessee was not estopped by his
promise. The Court emphasized that the redemption
legislation of 1884 and 1888 was promulgated, not for the
exclusive benefit of future leaseholders, but because of
the general feeling that perpetual, irredeemable leases
were injurious to the prosperity of the City of Baltimore
and that public policy demanded the future prohibition of
irredeemable rents. This explanation of the redemption
legislation has been reiterated many times by the Court,
and was amplified in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Marburg
where, speaking of the irredeemable ground rent system,
the Court stated:86
"It is well known

. . .

that the complex system of

ground rents in this State often rendered titles unmarketable, although in some instances the rents had
not been collected for many years, and some of them
were for such a nominal sum and were owned by so
many persons, that it was difficult to obtain the reversions for anything like a reasonable amount as compared with the rent reserved."
In rendering its decision in Stewart v. Garter,the Court
did not even indicate that the lease for fourteen years re85 70 Md. 242, 16 A. 644, 2 L. R. A. 711 (1889).

For similar statements,
86 110 Md. 410, 413, 414, 72 A. 839, 840 (1909).
see Swan v. Kemp, 97 Md. 686, 690, 691, 55 A. 441, 442, 443 (1903) ; Spear
v. Baker, 117 Md. 570, 573, 574, 84 A. 62, 64 (1912); Brager v. Bigham,
3 Balto. City Rep. 348, 351 (1915) overruled in 127 Md. 148, 96 A 277
(1915) ; Chief Judge Bond concurring in Silberstein v. Epstein, 146 Md.
254, 258, 259, 126 A. 74, 75, 76 (1924).
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newable forever might not be classified as a lease for more
than fifteen years within the meaning of the 1888 statute.
But in Swan v. Kemp,8 7 the second important case involving the redemption laws, the Court stated that though
strictly speaking the lease in Stewart v. Gorter had not
been within the language of the act of 1888, actually the
provision in the Stewart v. Gorter lease for successive,
continuous renewal leases was so plain an attempt to evade
the redemption law that the Court had had no difficulty
with the case. 8 Speaking of Stewart v. Gorter and the
redemption laws, Judge Jones in his decision in Swan v.
Kemp stated that the redemption legislation was, in effect,
pronounced remedial in nature in that case and "that it
is therefore by the settled rule of construction in such
cases to be liberally construed so as to advance the remedy
and suppress or prevent the mischief against which it is
directed." 89
Swan v. Kemp made two other important contributions
to the interpretation of the redemption legislation in addition to its explanation of Stewart v. Gorter. The first
concerned the holding that the 1888 act had not invalidated
the 1884 act as to leases made during the four year interim
between the acts. The Court stated that "where a repealing law contains a substantial reenactment of the previous
law the operation of the latter continues uninterrupted," 90
and also noted the principle that "where rights are acquired under a statute, in the nature of a contract, or
where there is a grant of power, a repeal of the statute will
not divest the right of the interest acquired under it, or
annul acts done under it."91 Thus it established a
definite precedent for handling leases executed before
87 97 Md. 686, 690, 55 A. 441, 442, 443 (1903).
88 But see King v. Kaiser, 126 Md. 213, 94 A. 780 (1915); Sweeney v.

Hagerstown Trust Co., 144 Md. 612, 125 A. 522 (1924); Silberstein v.
Epstein, 146 Md. 254, 126 A. 74 (1924); Maryland Theatrical Corp. v.
Manayunk Trust Co., 157 Md. 602, 146 A. 805 (1929) where this aspect
of Stewart v. Gorter has been discussed, approved, distinguished, and
limited.
8997 Md. 686, 690, 55 A. 411, 443 (1903).
9097 Md. 686, 691, 55 A. 441, 443 (1903).
81 97 Md. 686, 692, 55 A. 441, 443 (1903).
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amending ground rent legislation and litigated after its
passage.
The other contribution made by Swan v. Kemp was
that it applied a redemption law to a lease of improved
land. Since Stewart v. Gorter had concerned a lease of
an unimproved lot, this was a definite extension of the
coverage of the redemption legislation. However, it was
an easy extension for the Court to make because in 1903 it
was a well-known fact that nearly all recently-created
ground rents had attached to improved land and not to
empty lots. And so in order to give the redemption legislation any effect at all, the Court necessarily had to apply
it to leases of improved land. An additional factor was
that the redemption laws clearly referred to all leases of
more than fifteen years which would seem to include leases
of improved as well as unimproved land.
The broad language of the Acts of 1884, 1888, and 1900
has been however the cause of much trouble, for if construed literally these acts apply not only to ground rent
leases but to all business and residential leases of terms
in excess of fifteen years. The unfortunate aspect of such
a construction becomes particularly apparent in regard to
commercial building leases made since 1884 for these
leases, which often reserve and call for other types of consideration besides monetary rent, are hardly suited to outand-out redemption on a basis of the rent capitalized at
six per cent. With this in mind, the legislature in 1914
passed an act which was apparently supposed to state that
the legislature had always intended that business leases
of less than twenty-five years would be exempt from the
provisions of the acts of 1884, 1888, and 1900.92 Realizing
however that this act of 1914 was poorly drawn, the legislature in 1922 replaced its 1914 creation with a new law
which provided that the redemption laws were not intended to apply to business leases of ninety-nine years
or less.93
Thus, the legislature lifted all non-ground rent business
"' Md. Laws 1914, Ch. 371.
1Md. Laws 1922, Ch. 384 codified as Md. Code (1939) Art. 21, Sec. 115.
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leases created after 1922 from the coverage of the redemption legislation. 4 But unfortunately it was not able to
protect business leases executed between 1884 and 1914 or
indeed between 1884 and 1922.
. In 1929, the case of Maryland Theatrical Corp. v. Manayunk Trust Co. arose, involving a lease executed in 1914
after the act of that year had gone into effect.9 5 The lease
was for business purposes and did not exceed twenty-five
years and on that basis the lessor contended that his lessee
did not possess a statutory option of redemption under the
act of 1900 since the lease was governed by the act of 1914.
That act provided that the acts of 1884, 1888, and 1900
"were not intended to apply and do not apply to
leases or sub-leases of property leased for business
purposes when such leases or sub-leases contain a
clause prohibiting assigning or sub-leasing all or any
part or parts of the property leased, without the
written consent of the landlord, and where the term
of such leases or sub-leases, including all renewals
provided for, shall not exceed twenty-five years."9
The Court, in construing this statute, held that the lease
in the case before it was not exempt from the operation of
the act of 1900 since, although it was for business purposes
and was not in excess of twenty-five years, it did not prohibit assignment and sub-leasing of the property without
the written consent of the landlord. The Court stated that
it was quite reluctant to reach this conclusion, which
though in accord with the language of the statute, quite
obviously ran counter to the intent of the legislature.
As the result of this decision, the ordinary business
lease executed between 1914 and 1922 in excess of fifteen
years would seem to be subject to the redemption law of
1900. A fortiori, all such leases executed between 1884
and 1914 would seem to come within the purview of the
redemption statutes. Probably, this matter is a closed
91 The 1922 act exempted leases 99 years or less from the ope ation of
the redemption laws. Ground rent leases, as the term has been used in
this paper, are leases for 99 years renewable forever. But see Ogle
v. Reynolds, 75 Md. 145, 23 A. 137 (1891) discussed 8upra n. 2.,
" 157 Md. 602, 146 A. 805 (1929).
9o Md. Laws 1914, Ch. 371.
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book as far as the Court of Appeals is concerned but it is
submitted that the redemption acts were never intended
to apply to any but ground rent leases and that they
should have been construed in such a light.
The first case involving a business lease for a term of
fifteen years or more which had been executed prior to
the passage of the 1914 act was Brager v. Bigham17 This
case, decided in 1915, involved a sub-lease by leaseholders
of a three story building in down-town Baltimore on North
Eutaw Street, which then was Brager's Department Store,
and today is the Brager-Eisenberg Store. The lease, executed in 1906, was to run for a term of twenty years which
was to begin in 1915 on the expiration of a lease already
existing between the parties. The rental was to be $2,100
per year and the sub-lessee, in addition to covenanting to
pay this rent, agreed to erect a building at a cost of not
less than $20,000 by December, 1915, or in the alternative
to pay his lessors $10,000.
In February 1915, the sub-lessee requested redemption
on a six per cent basis under the act of 1900, but the defendant sub-lessor refused to convey his interest. At the
time of the demand and at the time the case came up before
the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, the plaintiff had neither
erected a new $20,000 building, nor paid the alternative
sum of $10,000.
Judge Bond, now Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals,
but then a member of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore
City, heard the case. His opinion stated that two main
questions were raised by it. One was whether the right
of redemption, if it existed, would come into being
five years after the execution of the leasing agreement, or
five years after the term began. The other-the main
question of the case-was whether the right of redemption
existed, that is, whether the lease involved came within
the purview of the redemption statutes.9 8 In reaching
127 Md. 148, 96 A. 277 (1915), reversing 3 Balto. City Rep. 348 (1915).
Judge Bond rested his decision on the proposition that the lease before him was not covered by the redemption statutes, but stated that he
believed the right of redemption would accrue five years after the execution of the instrument. The Court of Appeals, though reversing Judge
g8
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his answer to this latter question, Judge Bond started out
by distinguishing between leaseholds under ninety-nine
year renewable forever (or ground rent) leases and terms
under ordinary house and building leases, comparing the
former to the fee estates under Pennsylvania ground
rents.9 He then went on to make the following comment
upon the reasons behind the passage of the redemption
laws:
"From such of the published discussions as I could
find on objections made to these irredeemable ground
rents at or about the time of the passage of the
statutes, and from information I have obtained from
judges and attorneys who have recollections of the
discussion, it appears that there were four or five specific objections. For one, ground rents were so much
sought as investments that buildings were being
erected far in excess of any demand, merely in order
to create the ground rents under them. And this was
done upon loose, unsound financial arrangements
which brought confusion and injury. There was a
belief that this particular form of security withdrew
capital from activities which might advance the prosperity of the city, and into a position of usefulness.
Again, it was thought to produce a highly artificial,
unfair charge in a long course of time, in that as the
return upon capital naturally decreased this fixed unchangeable charge became disproportionately great
on many lots. The inevitable splitting-up of old lots
subject to ground rents had produced accumulations
of sub-leases and sub-rents, and so brought complaints
of confusions in land titles and unequal charges upon
portions of these old lots. And the existence of these
old rents, especially with the uncertainty and confusions in the titles to them, made
real property in
' 10 0
some instances unmarketable.'
Bond's decision on the main point in the case, held that the lessee could
redeem even before the start of the term. It said that the language of
the 1900 statute provided for redemption at five years from the date
of the lease or sub-lease, not from the commencement of the term. It
added that the latter construction would allow parties to frustrate the
exemption laws by executing a series of leases and agreements to take
effect at future times.
go Leasehold estates as compared with mere terms for years are also
distinguished in Culbreth v. Smith, 69 Md. 450, 459, 16 A. 112, 116, 1 L. B. A.
538, 541 (1888) and in Baltimore City v. Latrobe, 101 Md. 621, 61 A.
203 (1905). See also Crowe v. Wilson, 65 Md. 479, 5 A. 427 (1886).
100 3 Balto. City Rep. 348, 351 (1915).
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Continuing, Judge Bond stated that the mischiefs
sought to be cured by the redemption laws were therefore
incident to the ground rent system, and had no relation
to rents in building leases. However, he added that though
these reasons alone were probably not sufficient to exclude
the lease before him from the operation of the 1900 statute,
his reasoning was also supported by the title of the act of
1884 which declared that it proposed "to prohibit the creation in the future of irredeemable ground rents, and to
regulate the leasing of land." 101 The judge then noted that
a fair construction of the last seven words of the title of
the 1884 act seemed to indicate that the legislature did
not contemplate the regulation of all leases of "land", using
that word in its broadest sense. 102
The opinion then included a discussion of the difficulties
in the way of applying the redemption laws to building
leases and stressed that the active interests of both parties
to a building lease brought forth "a variety of considerations not all expressed in rent."'1 3 It observed that the
provision in the lease in the case at bar calling for the
erection of a $20,000 building or a payment of $10,000 was
almost surely entered into in conjunction with the rental
covenants and that possibly "the alternative payment of
$10,000 was a commutation of rent" to be waived in consideration of the plaintiff's construction of a new building.10
Judge Bond also referred to leases where there were
provisions for reduced rents if store fixtures were installed
and to a twenty-year no-rent lease in Feidmeyer v.
Werntz, 0 5 where the only bargain was that the lessee
should keep and maintain a certain space in the leased
building for the lessor. He concluded by discussing the
effect of the 1914 law, stating that it was not applicable
here since the lease was executed in 1906.
1l Md. Laws 1884, Ch. 485.

109 Judge Bond cited
222, 80 A. 899 (1911),
cluded land, was held
laws.
3 Balto. City Rep.
I" 3 Balto. City Rep.
105 119 Md. 285, 86 A.

Buckler v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 115 Md.
where a lease of railroad properties which innot to be within the purview of the redemption
348, 352 (1915).
848, 352 (1915).
986 (1913).
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In reversing Judge Bond's decision that the lessee did
not possess the right to redeem, the Court of Appeals, held
that so-called building leases were not distinguishable
under the language of the redemption laws, or under the
policy behind their passage, from other leases. It stated
that the lease of a building carried the land along with it
and therefore was a lease of land within the terms of the
redemption legislation. The Court admitted that there
was some injustice in allowing the sub-lessee in the case
before it to redeem before performing his agreement to
erect a $20,000 building or pay $10,000 but remarked that
first of all, the lessee's option to redeem was a statutory
right and that the parties had to be taken as having contracted in reference to it; and that secondly, as stated
in Stewart v. Gorter, the right of redemption was given
mainly for the benefit of the public. The first reason
might well be joined with the further remark that since
the Court had decided that the lessee could redeem and
buy out the lessor, the erection of a new building would
be rather immaterial to the lessor. But the plain answer
is that the parties did not contemplate redemption and
entered into a perfectly normal business arrangement
which only became abnormal when redemption was
allowed. If there were any reason for wanting to limit
the terms of business leases to fifteen years, then the result of Brager v. Bigham might be a necessary one; but
only the bare statement of the Court of Appeals that the
policy behind the redemption laws required the result
10 6
was given in rendering the decision.
100 Brager v. Bigham lay entirely by the wayside until 1923 when it
was cited for the first time in Williams v. State, 144 Md. 18, 24, 123 A.
457, 459 (1923), in support of the following quotation from Smith v.
State, 66 Md. 215, 217, 7 A. 49, 50 (1886): "Whatever latitude may, at
one time, have been assumed by courts in the construction of statutes,
the more recent cases have established the rule that when the language
of a legislative enactment is clear and unambiguous, a meaning, different
from that which the words plainly imply, cannot be judicially sanctioned.
Even when a court Is convinced that the Legislature really meant and
intended something not expressed by the phraseology of the act, it will
not deem Itself authorized to depart from the plain meaning of the
language which is free from ambiguity."
But note the following proposition stated in Chesapeake and Ohio
Canal Co. v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co., 4 G. and J. 1, 152 (Md. 1832)
which was cited and quoted by Judge Bond concurring in Silberstein v.
Epstein, 146 Md. 254, 258, 264, 126 A. 74, 75, 78 (1924) and was quoted
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The second case involving the redemption laws and
building leases arose in 1924. This was the case of Silberstein v. Epstein'07 and the specific problem before the court
was whether or not there could be specific performance
of a contract for sale of the New Howard Hotel, situated
in down-town Baltimore. The solution of this problem
turned on whether or not the lessee could successfully
claim the right to redeem under the statute of 1900.
The hotel had been leased in 1906 for ten years with a
privilege of renewal for another ten. In 1916 a second
lease was executed for ten years. The Court posed the
issue as follows: Was the 1916 lease a renewal of the 1906
lease? If not, it was but a ten year lease and so not
within the terms of the redemption law. The Court held
that the 1916 lease constituted a new contractual arrangement, noting that there had been an interval of several
weeks between the expiration of the 1906 lease and the
signing of the 1916 lease, that there was a new provision in
the second lease regarding payment of a mortgage on the
leased property, and that the parties apparently had
thought they were making a new bargain.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Bond, who had shortly
before been elevated to the Court of Appeals, reiterated
and restated the position he had taken in Bragerv. Bigham.
He commented on the perpetual character of ground rent
leases and opined that the redemption legislation was designed for ground rent leases and ground rent leases only.
He noted that long term business leases were known before 1884, but had become more popular with the growth
and approved as lately as Jones v. Gordy, 169 Md. 173, 180 A. 272 (1935) :
"Statutes should be construed with a view to the original intent and
meaning of the makers, and such construction should be put upon them,
as best to answer that intention which may be collected from the cause
or necessity of making the act, or from foreign circumstances; and
when discovered, ought to be followed, although such construction may
seem to be contrary to the letter of the statute. . . . That, therefore,
which is within the letter of the statute, is not within the statute, not
being the intention of the makers."
In this connection, it might be well to compare the following statement
by Mr. Justice Stone in Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U. S. 389, 394, 84
L. Ed. 287, 289, 60 S. C. 337, 339 (1940): "All statutes must be construed
in the light of their purpose. A literal reading of them which would lead
to absurd results is to be avoided when they can be given a reasonable
application consistent with their words and with the legislative purpose."
107 146 Md. 254, 126 A. 74 (1924).
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of business and the resultant need for the settled business
status which long term leases secured. In conclusion, he
proposed that the Court expressly overrule Brager v.
Bigham and hold that the lease before it was not a ground
rent lease and so not subject to the redemption law of 1900.
But then, in 1928, in Marburg v. Mercantile Building
Co., 08 the Court, in dealing with the application of the
redemption act of 1900 to a twenty-one year lease which
had no covenant for renewal, expressly approved Brager
v. Bigham and declined to overrule it. The lot and building involved in this case was located at Fayette Street
and Park Avenue in the heart of down-town Baltimore.
In holding that the lessee could redeem, the Court concluded that the redemption laws were entirely constitutional and did not violate the freedom of contract clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. It compared the Maryland
statutes to legislation in New York, Michigan, Iowa, Minnesota and Wisconsin, limiting the length of leases of agricultural land, and to legislation in Massachusetts, Alabama,
California, North and South Carolina, and Nevada limiting the periods of land and building leases. The Court
referred to the irredeemable ground rent system which
the legislature had intended to break up and proceeded
to apply the statute of 1900 to the commercial lease in the
case before it. Counsel for the ground rent owner had
argued that the acts of 1914 and 1922 indicated that the
legislature had never intended the redemption laws to
affect building leases but the Court's answer was that
the interpretation of statutes is for the courts and that
courts are not bound by the legislature's own interpretation of its prior acts.
The Court perhaps was influenced in making its decision
in this case by its knowledge of earlier litigation of the
same lease; for in handing down his opinion, Judge Sloan
stated that the defendant ground rent owner was not an
innocent victim of the law. The judge after noting that
in American Piano Co. v. Knabe, °9 counsel for this same
108 154 Md. 438, 140 A. 836 (1928).
Judge Bond concurred in this case,
the opinion being written by Judge Sloan.
109 131 Md. 111, 101 A. 680 (1917).

1940]

GROUND RENTS

defendant had admitted that the leasehold was redeemable
at six per cent, stated that the present plaintiff lessee had
taken an assignment of the lease for $20,000 and had invested an additional $30,000 in improvements, "all in contemplation of the redemption of the property, and in reliance upon the act of 1900, and the decisions of this
court ....

Undoubtedly, it would have been hard on the plaintiff
to have overruled Brager v. Bigham and denied him his
right of redemption. But hardships often result when a
court overrules itself.1 1 ' At any rate, the Court set its star
in Marburg v. Mercantile Building Co., and in Maryland
Theatrical Corp. v. Manayunk Trust Co.,"1 2 it showed that
it intended to follow the path it had marked out in Brager
v. Bigham. Here the property leased was the entrance
lobby of Keith's Theatre, situated on Lexington Street in
the middle of the shopping district of Baltimore. The
lease (actually a sub-lease) was executed in 1914 for six
years, with a right to renew in 1920 for eight more years,
and with an additional right to renew in 1928 for another
ten years. The lessor also granted to the lessee an option
to purchase the leasehold in 1938 for $125,000 subject to
an annual ground rent at $240. Thus, the parties had
seemingly worked out a business-like arrangement which
11 154 Md. 438, 445, 140 A. 836, 839 (1928).
111 Indeed, if the Court of Appeals had wished to overrule the Brager

case In Marburg v. Mercantile Building Co., 154 Md. 438, 140 A. 836
(1928) and still not subject the current plaintiff to undue hardship, it
might well have adopted the technique espoused by the State of Montana and upheld by Mr. Justice Cardozo of adhering to the established
rule in the case at bar and giving only future effect to its overruling decision. Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co., 287
U. S. 358, 77 L. Ed. 360, 53 S. C. 145 (1932).
11 157 Md. 602, 146 A. 805 (1929).
The effect of the 1914 Act upon the
lease in this case is discussed 8upra circa n. 94ff. The lessor also contended that the arrangement in question was really a series of short
leases and did not constitute a twenty-four year lease. See n. 88, 8upra.
The lessor in addition claimed that the rent was too uncertain. The
rent was $7,500 plus one-half of any increases in taxes over the 1914 assessment arising not from any increase in rate but solely from an increase in the assessment, plus water rent in excess of $13 a year, plus
fire insurance premiums in excess of $50 a year. The Court held these
items were easily ascertainable. Cf. Walker v. Washington Grove Ass'n,
127 Md. 564, 96 A. 682 (1916) where the redemption laws were held inapplicable to leases under a special Camp Meeting Association plan. This
case was distinguished by the Court In the Manayunk Trust Co. case,
supra.
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would hardly seem to contravene the welfare of the people
of Baltimore. And yet the provisions of the lease were in
effect set aside by the Court's construction of the 1900
statute.
To date, the Court has not been faced by a long-term
lease of residential or non-commercial property-a lease
which does not create the type of perpetual interest arising under a ground rent indenture. Probably there are
a relatively small number of such leases in existence. In
Bellevue Club v. Punte,113 a lease, for five years renewable for twenty-one, of a Middle River shore, boats, and
out-houses was brought before the Court by the lessee
fishing club which had sued to compel redemption; but
the Court disposed of the lessee's demand on other grounds
without ever mentioning the redemption legislation. However, there is no reason to believe that the Court, when
squarely faced by this problem, will not apply the rule of
Brager v. Bigham and treat long-term residential leases
exactly as if they were perpetual ground rent leases.
Whether such an application would be wise or not is
a question which cannot be easily answered. If it be assumed that the redemption legislation was directed at
ground rent leases and at ground rent leases alone, then
it would seem that they should not be construed to cover
any other type of lease. And yet it is necessary to note
that the redemption laws of 1884, 1888, and 1900 all provided for redemption of leases of more than fifteen years.
This flat fifteen year limit without reference to whether
the lease was renewable forever, is the strongest single
argument in favor of the rule of Brager v. Bigham and the
cases which followed in its wake. It is submitted that this
reason does not justify the decisions in those cases, particularly in view of the legislature's own expression of
opinion in 1914 and 1922 in regard to commercial leases.
But it also must be admitted that the existence of the
fifteen year limit might possibly support an application of
the redemption laws to long term residential leases of other
than the ground rent variety. The final answer to this
213

148 Md. 589, 129 A. 900 (1925).
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problem might depend on the Court's evaluation of the usefulness of long term leases. But it would seemingly be
better for the Court to say: the existing redemption laws
were directed toward ground rent leases; if the legislature
wishes to restrict other forms of long term leasing, it is
up to it to formulate legislation to handle the problem.
Undoubtedly in formulating any new laws, the legislature
would do well to keep in mind the connection of long term
residential leases to ground rent leases and whether under
the guise of the former a return to the old irredeemable
rent system was being manipulated. Of course, in reality,
the problem of long term residential leases does not exist
today in Maryland for they are so seldom employed. But
if it should arise, it might be well for the legislature to act
unless it desires a repetition of Brager v. Bigham, and the
consequent application of straight redemption to leasing
arrangements unsuited for such application.11 4
And yet despite the backfire of the redemption statutes
into the field of commercial and perhaps residential leases, that legislation has been responsible for changing the ground rent system into a workable, beneficial
mechanism. Before 1884, the irredeemable system was in
full swing and, really to appreciate the significance of the
acts of 1884, 1888, and 1900, it is necessary to look back
at the workings of the irredeemable system and note in
particular how it affected leaseholders.
Take for example the case of a leaseholder who in some
year before 1884 has executed an irredeemable ground rent
lease. He has a ninety-nine year lease renewable forever
and is therefore safe in making improvements on his property. But he must continue to pay a steady sum of rent
as long as he owns the leasehold. And even if he assigns
it, he remains liable for rent during the entire duration of
the term, or at least as long as he lives, 1 5 unless he has been
wise enough to have it created through a straw man. If
114 For
a general discussion of long term leases. see Note: The Long
Term Ground Lea8e: A Survey, (1939) 48 Yale L. J. 1400. For a brief
discussion of constitutional and statutory limitations on the length of
leases, see FREuND, POLI cE POWER (1904) Sec. 371.
215 Supra circa n. 67.
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the value of the property goes down, he must still continue his payments; indeed, the lessor, if he so desires, can
forego his right of reentry and sue the lessee for the semiannual rental payments each time they fall due. So if
a lessee remains financially solvent, he must pay his rent
unless he is able to assign the lease. If he is unable, he
is in reality a perpetual debtor.
Then also, if the value of the property goes up and
the lessee wants to clear his title, he will have to redeem
it at a very high price-transactions at one per cent have
occurred. There are many reasons why a lessee may wish
to clear his title. He may, for instance, own a term in a
small parcel of land in a down-town business area. Let
us suppose he gets an offer from a department store, which
is buying up an entire half-block to use as the site of a new
building. The store wants unencumbered fee simple titles.
Perhaps it plans to mortgage the property and its prospective mortgagee is demanding a clear fee title. Our lessee
goes to his landlord and asks him to redeem. (This assumes that there are not several strata of sub-rents with
consequent added complications.) The landlord refuses
to sell the fee, except at a very high price, a price which
the lessee who has invested heavily in his leasehold refuses
to pay and naturally so, since he wants to get at least the
fair value of what he put into the property plus an adequate percentage of its extra value to the store. The upshot is that the store may not be able to acquire the property it wishes to buy and which, in the interests of the
development of the city, it should buy.
It is true, of course, that the owner of any interest in
a particular piece of land can always "hold up" acquisition of a free and clear title. But as a result of the irredeemable ground rent system, this "hold-up" power was
spread and respread into the hands of so many persons as
to become quite objectionable and burdensome.
Another difficulty was that some ground rents had been
reserved on large tracts of land in the early days of the
city's history. Later these tracts were subdivided, but
despite the subdivision, the cloud of the entire ground
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rent continued to hang over each separate piece. For the
ground rent owner had and has the right to exercise his
rights of distraint and i eentry in regard to any part of
the leased premises when the tenant of another part of the
leasehold is in default. Probably he has not the right to
enforce personal liability for more than a proper proportion of the original rent from the assignee or sub-lessee
of each separate part of the leasehold-probably he cannot
thus collect the entire original rent from the owner of one
slice of the leasehold and force the latter to subrogate
himself to the landlord's claims against the owners of the
rest of the leasehold. 116 But even if this power is denied
to him, the original ground rent man has enough rights
in respect to each parcel of the leasehold under an irredeemable ground rent to hamper materially the clearing
of title to those premises.
Such complications were hardly within the ken of the
original landowners who created these irredeemable
leases against the setting of an agricultural and small town
society,117 but they have been headaches to many Baltimoreans since the city has become a commercial center,
and especially so during the period after the great fire of
1904 when a large part of the city had to be rebuilt."18 As
a matter of fact, however, one result of the big fire was

"ISee

1 TAYLOR, LANDLORD AND TENANT (9th ed. 1904), Sec. 109; 3
REAL PROPERTY (4th ed. 1939) Sec. 1421; 3 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) Sec. 882.
"17 MAYER, Op. cit. supra n. 2, 57.
"" The following appeared in the Baltimore Sun on December 23, 1904
under the title Ground Rcats an Obstarle and the sub-head Make Acquisition8 of Lots for City Improvements Dfficult:
"Chairman Swann of the Burnt District Commission, slid yesterday
that at least 50 pieces of property in the wharf district could be secured
at once if an agreement were reached between the owners of properties and the leasehold interest. He explained that ground rents had been
a continual source of trouble to the commission in acquiring property
in the market and wharf districts."
For condemnation powers given the Burnt District Commission, see
Md. Laws 1904, Ch. 87. For difficulties that arose in the condemnation
of property encumbered by irredeemable ground rents, see Baltimore
City v. Latrobe, 101 Md. 621, 61 A. 203 (1905) involving what is now
the Court House Plaza on St. Paul Street.
See also the Baltimore Sun, February 1, 1906, where there Is reference to a piece of property on Frederick Street In the burnt district lying
idle because it was burdened by an irredeemable ground rent which
seared off a prospective buyer who had planned to buy the property and
erect a building on it.
THOMPSON,
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"to wipe out a great many of the old irredeemable
rents, either by purchase, condemnation, or reentry."' 10
Mayer,12 0 writing in 1883, flatly advocated the prohibition of any more irredeemable ground rents. He referred to the extinguishment of quit rents in Maryland in
1780, of perpetual and long term rents in France in 1789,
in Germany in 1848, and. in New York in 1846 and 1848.
119 Letter of May 25, 1906 from Conway W. Sams, President of the Appeal Tax Court of Baltimore City, to Governor Otorge C. Pardee of California in answer to a letter written by the governor to Mayor Timanus of
Baltimore, which stated that the California legislature was considering
the advisability of introducing a ground rent system and asked for Information regarding the Maryland system. The reply letter traced the
history of the redemption legislation, enclosed a typical ground rent
lease, and commented that redeemable ground rents are "not much more
than five year mortgages, with the distinction that the mortgage can
remain indefinitely unless the tenant chooses to redeem, otherwise only
by default under the terms of the lease can the landlord reenter." The
writer estimated that about three hundred old irredeemable rents were
wiped out by the fire and stated that he thought Maryland would never
go back to the irredeemable system.
This letter was reprinted in the Baltimore American, May 26, 1906.
A copy of it can also be found in the Legislative Reference Library in
the City Hall.
For an earlier identical statement that the Baltimore fire wiped out
a great many irredeemable rents, see Leser, TVhat the Grcat Fire Has
Accomplished for Baltimore, Municipal Engineering, November 1905, vol.
29, no. 5. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Latrobe, 1(1 Md. 621, 61 A. 203
(1905) where the Court had before it a condemnation problem, and
severely limited its earlier decision in Gluck v. Mayor of Baltimore, 81
Md. 315, 32 A. 515 (1895).
Another letter of Interest in this connection was written May 18, 1906
by one John E. Bennett, apparently a member of the San Francisco Bar,
from San Francisco to the Editors of the Baltimore Sun and the Baltinmore American. It starts off by stating that the "Legislative Committee on Reconstruction of San Francisco has adopted a recommendation
to the legislature to put into operation in California the 99-year lease
or the ground rent system." The writer goes on to say that he was a
resident of Baltimore and a member of time bar during the '80's when the
irredeemable ground rent system was discarded and notes the reasons
why it was discarded and asks that the Sun and/or American publish
some information concerning the history of the ground rent system.
The writer concluded as follows: "Perhaps I am asking too much of
you, but our libraries here are all burned, and we have no access to
reference works which would give us the information sought at this
time upon the general subject, and the specific local Information as regards Maryland you probably have at hand. Whatever you may be pleased
to publish will be embodied In a communication to tie Legislature for
its information.
"I enclose 50 cents for two months' subscription to your paper."
This letter was commented on in a Baltimore Sun editorial (May 29,
1906) which stated that the Committee on Reconstruction of San Francisco would recommend to the California Legislature the adoption of
the ground rent system in order to facilitate the borrowing of money
on lots made vacant by the fire so that houses could be rebuilt. The editorial also reviewed the history of the Maryland ground rent system.
1SO Mayer, op. cit. supra n. 2, 127-130.
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He noted the Pennsylvania ground rent redemption legislation of 1850 and 1869121 and declared that though the
form of the Pennsylvania Act could not be followed since
the Pennsylvania and Maryland systems were based on
different principles, still public opinion in Maryland was
favoring a law with the same object. He then included a
copy. of the preambles and resolutions in favor of a law
prohibiting the future creation of irredeemable ground
rents in Maryland which had been offered before the Baltimore City Council in February of 1883 by Henry N. Bankard. The first section of the preamble reads:
"Whereas the State of Maryland is the only place
that tolerates perpetual debts in the shape of irredeemable ground rents; . . .

and it goes on to point out many evils of the irredeemable
122
system.
Of course, the Redemption legislation has largely cured
the "irredeemable evil" but the problem still remains and
will almost surely continue to remain in regard to the
irredeemable ground rents renewable forever which are
now in existence. For under the due process clauses of
both the State and Federal Constitutions, these interests
as a general proposition cannot be abolished.
M The
Pennsylvania Redemption Act of 1869 (Pamph. L. 1869, p. 47,
Purd. 1570) was declared unconstitutional in Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa.
479 (1871) ; a later redemption act which is still In effect is Pa. Public
Laws 1885, 161, See. 1 codified as Pa. Code, Title 68, See. 162. The Act
of 1850, still in effect, is Pa. Public Laws 1850, 549, Sec. 21 codified as
Pa. Code. Title 68, Sec. 161.
122 Bankard
was a member of the City Council of Baltimore for the
14th ward. Mayer mentions that he was active for many years in his
opposition to the Irredeemable system. In 1897, Bankard made an address before the Taxpayer's Association of Baltimore City entitled "Taxation-under the New and Old Assessment Laws," dated September 8,
1897 and published in Baltimore In that year by the Sun Book and Job
Printing Office. One portion of the address, pp. 22-24, is entitled "The
Irredeemable Ground Rent Evil." In it, Bankard claimed that every taxpayer in Maryland was paying tribute to the holders of irredeemable
ground rents, contending that the system was responsible for the deficiency in the taxable basis. (This claim would not seem to have any
basis since the tax assessors can and could assess Independently of the
existence of any ground rent.)
He valued ground rents then In existence at $60,000,000 and perhaps was talking only of irredeemable ground
rents. In this connection see the 6th Annual Report of the Bureau of Industrial Statistics for Maryland (for 1897) which states that no records as to the amount of land held under ground rent have been kept but
that the Tax Department estimated that about 75% of the property in
the city was then held subject to ground rent.
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However, it is well to note that despite all the trouble
caused by the irredeemable ground rents, the legislature
apparently realized that the ground rent system contained
many distinct advantages and that therefore it did not attempt to do away with the system entirely.
One indication of what was in the legislature's mind
can be gleaned from the language of the redemption legislation itself. From this language it appears certain that
the legislation contemplated the present development of
redeemable ground rents.
A second indication that the legislature did not wish
to do away with ninety-nine year leases was the passage
of other remedial ground rent legislation in the 1884, 1886,
and 1888 sessions. One of those other acts12 s provides that
whenever there has been no demand for, or payment of
rent reserved for twenty years, it is to be conclusively presumed that the rent is extinguished'12 unless the lessor at
the expiration of the twenty year period proves he was
under a legal disability to assert his claim. This statute,
held constitutional in Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Marburg, 12 5 was another step by the legislature in its cam12 Md. Laws 1884, Ch. 502 codified as Md. Code (1939) Art. 53, Sec.
36. Other remedial legislation passed in the 1880's included the automatic renewal statute, Md. Code (1939) Art. 21, Sec. 113. Later ground
rent redemption legislation includes the trustee-redemption act, Md. Code
(1939) Art. 16, Sec. 275, considered in Kingan Packing Ass'n v. Lloyd,
110 Md. 619, 73 A. 887 (1909) ; and in McCrory Stores v. Bennett, 159
Md. 568, 152 A. 258 (1930) ; the infant-redemption act, Md. Code (1939)
Art. 93, Sec. 179; the unmarried-women-over-eighteen redemption act, Md.
Code (1939) Art. 21, Sec. 2. See also Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Secs.
116 and 150 enacted in 1884 and connected with the renewal legislation.
See also Md. Laws 1884, c. 502 codified as Md. Code (1939) Art. 53, See. 35.
124 Four methods of extinguishing ground rents are listed in Liss, The
Ground Rent System in Maryland, Baltimore Daily Record, August 6,
1937: (1) forfeiture for breach of covenant; (2) merger (Mayer, op. cit.
supra n. 2, 70) ; (3) adverse possession; (4) redemption. A fifth method
is estoppel. See Jones v. Rose, 96 Md. 483, 54 A. 69 (1903).
125 110 Md. 410, 72 A. 839 (1909).
The Court construed the statute to
provide that failure to demand or receive payment of rent for twenty
years operated not only to bar any action for rent by the landlord, but
also to automatically extinguish the landlord's reversionary interest. The
Court also stated that the statute may have been hastened by the decision in Myers v. Silljacks, 53 Md. 319 (1882) where it had been held
that possession by a tenant and non-payment of rent were not sufficient
to bar the landlord's title and right to demand future payments of rents
even though the Statute of Limitations barred his claims for back rent.
The Court reasoned that the Were non-payment of rent did not show
any hostility on the part of the tenant or any denial of the lessor's rights,
sufficient to bring about adverse possession. For this same proposition,
see Gwynn v. Jones' Lessee, 2 G. and J. 173, 184 (Md. 1830) and Camp-
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paign to remove from leasehold properties the harmful
restrictions which were tying up the development and
126
the use of a great deal of land.

Taking the redemption and other remedial legislation
together, it can be clearly seen that they materially
changed the status of the lessee under a ground rent demise. But it also is necessary to note that leaseholders
under such leases were still just as liable on their covenants as they had been before the period of remedial legislation began; and until they exercised their statutory options of redemption, they were still merely owners of
personalty subject to tenurial and possibly contractual obligations.'2 7 However, for the most part there have been
only scattered complaints about the lessee's position since
the statutory changes discussed above were put into effect,
and most observers have felt that in the last thirty years
the redeemable ground rents have been an exceedingly
satisfactory and beneficial institution.

VII. A COMPARISON OF REDEEMABLE GROUND RENTS AND
MORTGAGES

A redeemable ground rent is in effect a mortgage without a due date-a mortgage whose principal need never
be paid-with an option in favor of the "mortgagor" to
pay it off at any time after the expiration of five years at
a capitalization of six per cent.
Mayer, commenting in 1883, when there were but few
redeemable ground rents, noted that they were sometimes
bell v. Shipley, 41 Md. 81, 96 (1874). See also Arnd v. Lerch, 162 Md.
318, 159 A. 587 (1932), involving the adverse possession act of 1884, Md.
Code (1939) Art. 53, Sec. 36.
Cf. Wilson v. Isemminger, 185 U. S. 55, 22 Sup. Ct. 573 (1902), where
the United States Supreme Court sustained the validity of the Pennsylvania Act of April 27, 1855, which raised a conclusive presumption of
extinguishment of a ground rent after non-payment for twenty-one years.
lI'l For instance,
the 1884 extinguishment statute must have been the
means of extinguishing many one-cent rents and such token rents (e. g.
peppercorn, arrowhead, etc.) as still existed that late in the nineteenth
century.
12 A leaseholder with the statutory right to redeem is the owner of
personalty and not realty until he exercises that right, just as he was
before the redemption legislation. Leaseholds have always been considered personalty except in so far as these rules have been modified by
express legislation. Holzman v. Wagner, 114 Md. 322, 79 A. 205 (1911).
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used in lieu of mortgages for securing loans or for making
up the unpaid residue of purchase money on the sale of
28
property.
In Mayor of Baltimore v. Canton Co., the Court of Appeals said:
"The landlords interest in land is but a form of
money investment,
analogous to that secured by a
129
mortgage.'
In Posner v. Bayless, a previous case, the Court had
already held as follows:
"A redeemable ground rent is a common and
ordinary form of securing a loan of money. In fact
a ground rent redeemable at a definite future period
has most of the essential features of and is practically
nothing more than a mortgage to secure a principal
sum, the interest of which is placed in the form of an
annual rent ....
However, it is well to remember that though a redeemable ground rent and an ordinary mortgage are very similar, they have different aspects. When a ground rent is

"I

Mayer, op. cit. supra n. 2, 120.
22 63 Md. 218, 237 (1885).
13059 Md. 56, 60 (1882). See also Whiting-Middleton Co. v. Preston, 121
Md. 210, 88 A. 110 (1913).
Ground rents have been treated like mortgages in many instances. They
have been included in the statutory classification of "mortgages and Instruments in the nature of mortgages." 21 Ops. A. J. 760 (1936) regarding interpretation of the so-called Mortgage Deduction Act, Md. Code
Supp. (1935) Art. 81, Secs. 2, 15(b).
Another instance is tied up with the policy of the FHA. That federal agency will guarantee loans up to 80% or 90%, depending on the
status of the property. In guaranteeing mortgages on leasehold estates,
the FHA deducts the capitalized value of a redeemable ground rent
(which is usually the annual rent capitalized at six per cent) from
80% or 90% of the fee value of the property. Thus the FHA does not consider the leasehold as a separate entity, but values the property as a whole,
and deducts the capitalized value of the ground rent just as if it were a
mortgage. If it treated each leasehold as a separate entity it would deduct the amount of the ground rent from the fee simple value, thus get
the value of the leasehold and approve a loan up to 80% or 90% of
that amount. Such a procedure would allow leaseholders to borrow
more money from the FHA. In protesting the policy of the FHA, the
Baltimore Real Estate Board argued that a ground rent Is not a first
mortgage, but only a fixed charge like a tax charge, and claimed that
It is no more justifiable to capitalize a ground rent and treat it as a
mortgage than to capitalize the annual tax bill and treat it as a mortgage.
This contention seems entirely incorrect for a redeemable ground rent
is certainly more like a mortgage than a tax charge. See Editorial,
Realtors Protest FHA Rules-As k Change, Baltimore Real Estate News,
April 1938, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 1, 2.
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created, the lessee buys a leasehold and a privilege to buy
in the reversion at the end of five years from the date of
the creation of the lease. Where there is a mortgage, the
creation of a debtor-creditor relationship is considered the
crux of the transaction and the conveyance is treated as
being really for the purpose of securing the indebtedness. 131 Mayer, 3 2 writing in 1883, queried whether a lessee
under a redeemable ground rent should not be allowed the
privilege possessed by the ordinary mortgagor of discharging at any time he chose, but the Court of Appeals appears
to have summarily rejected this proposition when it was
advanced by counsel in 1893 in Packard v. Corp. for Relief
33
of Widows.1
However, despite the fact that a leaseholder cannot
redeem at will, he can under the present state of the law,
redeem any ground rent created after 1900 at any time
after five years of the term has elapsed-that is, he can
redeem anywhere along the line between five and ninetynine years and anytime after that if he renews the lease
or can claim automatic renewal under the act of 1886.""
And so the fact that leaseholders cannot redeem during the
first five years is no great detriment.
It is worthwhile noting that relatively few ground
rent defaults occurred during the recent depression. In
fact, it is probably true that in times of depression
and money panic, Baltimore has seen less of the foreclosure evil than have other large cities in which only
ordinary mortgages are used. 13 This may be largely be"'Nevertheless, a usurious mortgage loan cannot be covered up by the
use of ground rent trimmings. Montague v. Sewell, 57 Md. 407, 412,
413 (1881) where the Court held that what was in form a ground rent
lease was in fact a loan because of "well established facts . . . which
cannot be satisfactorily accounted for upon any other theory than that
the transaction was a loan ....
..
See also Gaither v. Clark, 67 Md. 18,
8 A. 740 (1887); Odd Fellows Association v. Merklin, 65 Md. 579, 5 A.
544 (1886) ; Oxenham v. Mitchell, 160 Md. 269, 153 A. 71 (1930).
But
see Packard v. Corp. for Relief of Widows, 77 Md. 240, 26 A. 411 (1893)
and Rosenstock v. Keyser, 104 Md. 380, 65 A. 37 (1906) where the Court
felt that there was not clear evidence that the parties intended to make
loans and treated the transactions concerned as involving ground rents.
132 Mayer, op. cit. supra n. 2, 122.
138 77 Md. 240, 26 A. 411 (1893).
18, See supra circa n. 56.
135 Ferguson, In Defense of Baltimore's Ground Rent System. Baltimore
Evening Sun, January 14, 1914.
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cause Baltimore, though not a boom city, is also not a depression city. But also it is at least partially due to the
redeemable ground rent system. For when a money panic
comes at the same time as a mortgage falls due (and there
are always a certain number of mortgages which come due
just at the height of a panic) it is almost impossible to refinance 'them. In the last depression, the problem was
partially solved in some states by broad mortgage moratorium legislation.18 6 But in the past, money panics have
often caused foreclosures which have wiped out many
working men and discouraged others from attempting to
save and finance purchases of their own homes. 187 Baltimore, with a great deal of its property under ground rents
rather than mortgages, has not had to bear the full force of
any such panic. For as long as the leaseholders were able to
scrape together or borrow enough money to meet their
rental and tax payments, there were no ground rent ejectments. And of course only needing small sums of money
in comparison with the large amounts required by mortgagors with principal payments on their hands, lease1
Note the Maryland Mortgage Moratorium legislation Md. Laws 1933,
Special Session, Ch. 57; Md. Laws 1935 Ch. 527, codified as Md. Code
(1939) Art. 66, Sec. 7; Md. Laws 1937, Ch. 173; Md. Code (1939) Art.
66, Sec. 7. Also Md. Laws, 1933, Special Session, Ch. 56; Md. Laws
1935, Ch. 589 codified as an amendment to Md. Code Pub. Loc. L. (1930)
Art. 4, Sec. 720, to be known as See. 720A; and Md. Laws 1937, Ch. 174;
c. 251 (vetoed).
These acts apply only to certain fractional interests in
unpaid mortgage debts and do not constitute broad mortgage moratorium legislation.
187 Such hardship is best illustrated by reference to an editorial of
May 9, 1909 in the Baltimore Sunday Sun entitled "Home-Makers and
Our Redeemable Ground-Rent System" which retold briefly the story of
Barach Sholinky which was published in the May 1909 number of World's
Work in an article entitled "How a Home-Maker Became an Anarchist."
Briefly the story tells of a man who toiled for 16 years on the East Side
of New York existing with an increasing family in a tenement, paying
$5 per month as rent, a large per cent of his income. By dint of much
hardship he and his family saved $1,500 out of Joint earnings and bought
a $6,000 home in 1904 in Brooklyn. Of this $6,000, $2,500 was to be paid
in cash and installments; for the remaining $3,500 there was a 5% mortgage due September 1, 1907. Came the fall of 1907 with a money panic
in New York and Barach found himself unable to get a loan to pay off
his mortgage. His life savings went up in smoke; he who was a homemaker became an anarchist. Frank Bailey, Vice-President of Title Guaranty and Trust Co. of New York wrote the article. Bailey apparently
advocated a system like that of the Credit Foncier of France which is
designed to put at the disposal of persons of small means safe ways of
borrowing money at low interest on real estate security, and repaying the
money in installments without danger of foreclosure.
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holders were often able to borrow, even in a tight money
market, the money they needed to forestall ejectment.
With these considerations in mind, it is time to ponder
over the point of view of a man who owns vacant property. Usually, he will wish to improve it or dispose of it
at a profit, for while it is vacant he is deriving neither enjoyment nor profit from it and, moreover, what is worse,
he is paying taxes on it.'88 By improving the land and selling it subject to a ground rent, he can shift the taxes and
acquire a valuable, profit-yielding investment. The result
has been that these vacant lot owners have either themselves become builders or have sold out to builders who
have erected houses and disposed of the improved premises,
very often under a ground rent method of finance."9
Why have these builders preferred redeemable ground
rents to purchase money mortgages? First of all, it must
be realized that there are some circumstances under which
a purchase money mortgage is preferable. But usually the
builder will create a ground rent because experience and
the practical workings of psychology have shown that if a
builder has a small piece of commercial or residential property, he will find it easier to sell as leasehold property subject to a redeemable ground rent than as fee property
subject to a first mortgage. Indeed, he will probably find
it possible to sell the property by way of ground rent at a
higher price than by way of a straight cash sale or a cash
and mortgage sale. There are two main reasons for this.
First, although a $60 ground rent representing $1,000 of
the purchase price is equivalent to paying six per cent on
a mortgage, it somehow seems cheaper to many purchasers
to be talking in terms of $60 than in terms of $1,000.140
Second, and of course more important, is the fact that if a
ground rent is placed on the property, the buyer will
never be forced to repay the principal, though it is his
option to do so at any time after five years have elapsed.
"38 Of course, some owners of vacant lots are speculators who are holding them in expectation of appreciation in the value of the property.
'll see infra, Section VIII, entitled "Advance Building".
10 Hobbs, The Good and Bad of Ground Rents, Baltimore Evening Sun,
March 24, 1937, p. 27; Hearn, These Row Houses, Baltimore Sunday Sun,
December 19, 1937, pp. 6, 7.
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On the other hand, if he buys subject to a purchase money
mortgage, he will either have to amortize the principal of
the mortgage loan and pay it off gradually over the life of
the mortgage, or he will be faced by one big lump sum
payment of the principal at the termination of the mort4
gage period.1 '
Good ground rents today can usually be sold at approximately five and one-half per cent while attractive first
mortgages can sometimes be financed for as little as four
per cent. It is for this and also for several other reasons
that it is impossible to state dogmatically that a redeemable ground rent is preferable to a purchase money mort-

gage in the eyes of either the purchaser or the seller.
Ground rents have historically been good commercial
risks.141 a This has been no accident, for the percentage of
the ordinary ground rent to the value of the premises is
very small in contrast to mortgages, which usually are for
a great deal more than fifty per cent of the value of the

"'It is true that a mortgagee, satisfied with his investment, may let
the mortgage run as long as his mortgagor desires, especially in an easy
money market. This is particularly true if the security behind the
mortgage is adequate. For a mortgage like a ground rent is frequently
an investment in the eyes of a mortgagee and if he calls in the mortgage, he only has to invest it again. But still the mortgagor can never
feel quite as safe as a lessee under a redeemable ground rent for he
can never tell when Mr. Mortgagee will say: "The jig's up." And that
feeling which tends to make a borrower steer away from taking out a
mortgage also reacts against the interests of the mortgagee who desires to let the mortgage debt run on. If he had a ground rent, his lessee
would be secure in letting it run on. Under a mortgage, the debtor can
never feel entirely secure. Of course, the mortgagee may renew the
mortgage for a definite term. But then at the end of that term, the
same problem will arise. See Bosley v. Bosley's Executrix, 14 Howard's
Sup. Ct. Rep. 390, 396, 14 L. Ed. 468, 471 (1852) where Mr. Chief Justice
Taney, said that "it is far more convenient [to use a redeemable ground
rent in sales of ground] than a mortgage or a bond of conveyance, both
to the seller and the purchaser. For it enables the vendee to postpone
the payment of a large portion of the purchase money until he finds it
entirely convenient to pay it; and at the same time it is more advantageous to the vendor, as it gives him a better security for the punctual
payment of the interest; and while an extended credit is given to the
vendee, it is to the vendor a sale for cash. For if his ground rent is
well secured, he can, at any time, sell it in the market for the balance
of the purchase money left in the hands of the vendee."
"'a Cf. Rule 23, Circuit Courts, Supreme Bench of Baltimore City,
providing that a trustee, "to be relieved of responsibility for the choice
of investments to be made of funds under the jurisdiction of the equity
courts," must invest in certain securities, mortgages, or "ground rents on
unencumbered real estate situate in Maryland where the amount of the
rent capitalized at six per cent is not over fifty per cent of the value of
the property from which they issue."
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property. The reason why there is more cushion behind
a ground rent lies in the natural hesitation of persons to
buy investments which can never be called in, unless there
is more than a slight differential between the value of the
property represented by that investment and the amount
of the investment. 142 In contrast, they will require less
cushion when they buy mortgages for then they are in
reality making a loan which is due in a few years. The
time limit being so short, they feel rather certain that they
will be repaid before the security behind their loan will
have a chance to depreciate to any great extent. On the
other hand, in the case of a ground rent they cannot be
sure that the property represented by their perpetual investment will not greatly deteriorate in value. Then also
this demand for more cushion behind a ground rent
than behind a purchase money mortgage goes hand in hand
with the fact that people consider themselves investors
and not lenders when they purchase ground rents. And
indeed it would seem that though redeemable ground rents
have many of the incidents of purchase money mortgages,
and are sometimes used interchangeably with such mortgages, they are more like capital investments than loans.
What advantages besides the no-payment-of-principal
factor are possessed by the leaseholder over the purchase
money mortgagor? For one thing, it is probably true that
if he desires to borrow further on the security of his leasehold, he will probably be able to do so more easily by way
of a leasehold mortgage than can the first mortgagor by
way of a second fee mortgage. 142a Of course, this will depend in a large measure on the size of the first mortgage. If
it is small, the mortgagor will find it easier to float a second
fee mortgage. But even so, he usually will have more
trouble placing a second fee mortgage on his property than
a leaseholder will have in taking out a leasehold mortgage.
This is because the buyer of a leasehold mortgage always
142 See this Idea put forward in Packard v. Corp. for Relief of Widows,
77 Md. 240, 249, 250, 26 A. 411, 414 (1893).
'"a Note, however, that a leasehold mortgagee, upon default by the
leaseholder, becomes liable under the ground rent covenants. See supra
circa n. 69.
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knows that the ground rent man-the owner of the prior
lien-can never demand repayment of the principal.
Therefore he realizes that the annual rental payments due
to the ground rent holder and performance of the obligations
of the ground rent covenants are the only obstacles to the
collection of interest on his leasehold mortgage and the
repayment of the principal of that mortgage. 143
This feeling of security pervades the philosophy of all
ground rent buyers. They feel that the leaseholder has
such a large equity in the property in proportion to the
ground rent that he will be very unlikely to forfeit the
equity by failing to pay that rent. Closely related to this
feeling is the policy of most ground rent owners of not
requiring their lessees to carry insurance on the premises.
Since mortgages usually require that insurance be carried,
this is a slight advantage in favor of the leaseholder.
Ground rent owners have adopted the no-insurance policy
because they calculate that even if the house and other
improvements on the premises should be destroyed, the
value of the vacant lot plus the worth of non-destroyable
improvements such as the foundation, will equal and prob144
ably surpass the ground rent investment.
A further advantage that a ground rent holds over a
mortgage is in regard to the policy of building and loan
associations which, at least in the past, have lent more
1,8 Note the FHA policy discussed in n. 130, 8upra.
"' Sometimes but rarely ground rent owners do require that lessees
carry insurance. More often, however, they carry ground rent insurance
themselves. This type of insurance is exceedingly cheap, the premium
being approximately one-third of the fire rate. Nevertheless, the policy
of at least certain trust companies, who along with other moneyed corporations in Maryland are the largest investors in grounds rents, is to
carry this insurance only on frame buildings or badly dilapidated structures. Under a ground rent insurance policy, the insurance company will
agree to do one of two things in the event that the improvements are
destroyed and not rebuilt within a specified period: (1) the company
will reimburse the ground rent owner for the amount of damage he has
sustained up to the insured sum, or (2) it will pay to him the agreed
value of the ground rent and take over the ground rent. The agreed
value, which may or may not be the same as the sum Insured and which
is often larger, is agreed on at the time the policy is written in order
to avoid dispute later on. Under this type of contract, the insurance
company is given an option which enables it to take advantage of any
rise in the value of the ground rent over the agreed value. It thus behooves ground rent owners who take out this type of insurance to mark
up the agreed value as the market value of their ground rents increases.
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freely on property burdened by a ground rent than on
property burdened by a mortgage because with a ground
145
rent there is no necessity of amortizing the principal.
Suppose a purchaser has gone to such an association
and requested a loan. He can afford to pay down a certain amount as an initial payment and he can raise so much
in the open market by means of a mortgage or a ground
rent. He wants to get the rest from an association. The
association, before granting the requested loan, will work
out the weekly charge which it will assess the purchaser.
That charge will include taxes, insurance, water, building
and loan association dues, and also a sum sufficient to
meet the payments due under the ground rent or the mortgage. The latter sum will be much greater if there is a
mortgage because the association will include costs of
amortization in its charge, whereas under a ground rent
there will be no such inclusion. The fact that this sum
will be larger may cause the association to decide that the
extra sum might make it impossible for the borrower to
keep up his payments, and lead it to refuse to lend unless
the borrower agree to finance by way of a ground rent.
This has probably been the case in regard to many working
men to whom the difference of a dollar or two a week is
vital. 4 6
To the advantages thus far mentioned which are possessed by a leaseholder over a mortgagee, it is necessary to
add the possible advantage in regard to avoidance of personal liability after assignment of the leasehold interest.
A leaseholder can do this by having the ground rent lease
created through a straw man. Such a procedure is custom1'8 In 1914, a $2,500 house could be bought with an initial payment of
$100 and a weekly charge of $7.43 over 14 years. The $2,400 left over
the $100 initial payment was taken care of by a $60 ground rent which
capitalized at 6% is $1,000 and a $1,400 Building and Loan Association
mortgage. Ferguson, In Defense of Baltimore's Ground Rent System,
Baltimore Evening Sun, January 14, 1914.
1,6 Such an attitude on the part of building and loan associations was
quite important, for most of the people who applied to them were working people. Today these people can secure help from the FHA. But in
the past this has not been possible and in the future it may not be.
Many working men in the past have bought houses by resort to a ground
rent and an association loan. Many others have financed home purchases
solely by means of a ground rent.
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ary in Maryland. 14 7 Therefore, if he is alert, the real
original lessee can avoid the personal liability which attaches to privity of contract with the landlord: that is, he
can avoid the burden of remaining liable after assignment
for the rent during the duration of the lease. In contrast it
is not customary in Maryland for straw men to be used
in creating a mortgage and so mortgagors who are personally liable for the mortgage debt do not necessarily lose
their personal liability by sale or other disposition of their
equity in the property.
When one considers all the advantages in favor of
leaseholders along with the excellent record of ground
rents as investments, one tends to lose sight of the fact
that redeemable ground rents are not always more desirable instruments of real property financing than purchase
money mortgages even though such is often the case. In
the first place, it is difficult to place a very large ground
rent on a property for the simple reason that investors
have found by experience that large rents on high price
residential property, even though well-cushioned, are not
very safe propositions, since the characters of many residential neighborhoods change so rapidly. In the second
place, ground rent investors want plenty of cushion. The
usual value ratios between ground rents and the underlying premises encumbered by them range from about three
to four to one at time of creation. In the third place, if
the property in question is in a run-down section of the
city or is in bad condition itself, it may be impossible to
secure anything but a short term mortgage since the longrun picture seems so very insecure and uncertain. In the
fourth place, there is the matter of money rates which
may make it desirable for either the seller or the buyer
of real property to employ a purchase money mortgage.
Let us take the case of a builder who has a $4000 piece
of property for sale and suppose that he has the choice
of selling it subject to a $60 ground rent at six per cent
or a $1000 mortgage at five per cent. In either case he
17

See supra circa n. 67.
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would have about the same amount represented by the
ground rent or the mortgage. 14 Which method will he
choose? The answer is that he will almost always prefer to use the ground rent method. Under it, he can obtain
a higher rate of interest; also he will be taking little risk
since he will almost surely be able to dispose of his rent
at six per cent and probably at a premium.'4 9 What little
risk he takes is embodied in the possibility that he will
not be able to sell the rent, that the property will depreciate in value, and that he will never be able to demand
repayment of the $1000 from his lessee. Under these circumstances, he would wish that he had sold subject to a
mortgage. But such circumstances are unusual.
On the other hand, a purchaser of a new home may
not be willing to buy subject to a ground rent. He may
say: "I know I'll have the money to pay you back at the
end of five years. I'll buy subject to a $1000 five-year
mortgage at five per cent. Why should I pay six per cent
in the form of rent when I intend to pay off the lien,
whether it be a mortgage or a ground rent, at the end of
five years?" And such an attitude would be entirely sensible. The only fly in the ointment will come if the purchaser does not have the $1000 handy at the expiration of
the five year period. And so it is not always true that
ground rents are the solution of either a seller's or purchaser's problems, though there are many situations where
it is desirable to create ground rents in place of purchase
money mortgages. However, it is always necessary to look
at the peculiar circumstances of each case in order to determine when the ground rent method is preferable.
It would seem that ground rents would also be resorted
to by property owners desiring to raise money on the se2,8 A $60 ground rent created at 6% would sell at $1,000.
It figures out
as follows:
By hypothesis, $60 equals 6%. Therefore 1% equals $10 and 100%
equals $1,000.
"The phrase "Selling at a premium" can best be explained by this
type of illustration.
A builder having taken a $60 ground rent at 6%,
sells it to an investor at 5 %. That is, he sells it for $1,090.91, making
a profit of $90.91. It figures out as follows:
By hypothesis, $60 equals 51/%. Therefore, 1% equals $120 divided by
eleven; and 100% equals $1,090.91 (plus a small fraction).
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curity of their property-that a would-be "borrower" owning fee property would convey the fee to his "lender" who
would convey back a leasehold for ninety-nine years renewable forever. In effect, the would-be-borrower would
be capitalizing a proportion of his property represented
by the ground rent. The "lender" who is really not a
lender but an investor would thus hand over the sum of
money being "borrowed" and retain a ground rent as his
interest and security. This process would require the
property owner to give up the fee title to his property and
accept instead a leasehold estate, but this would not be
objectionable since he could always redeem the fee after
five years if he saw fit. Such a method seemingly would
possess the same advantages over the ordinary fee mortgage that a ground rent possesses over a purchase money
mortgage. But it is seldom used, 150 probably because the
type of property owner who would find the method attractive is the owner of a moderately priced home or small
store and he has almost always purchased subject to a
ground rent in the first place. Owners of more expensive
commercial and residential property will not wish to create a ground rent, for if they decide to borrow at all on
the security of their real estate they will almost always
want to raise a sum close to the total value of the premises which will be too large a sum to be raised by way of
ground rent. And then again, even if they would be satisfied with a smaller sum, there is no assurance that they
would find ready purchasers, for sums which may be small
in relation to the value of such property would still represent large rents and trust companies and other investors
have a definite preference for small ground rents. This
is because a portfolio of small ground rents, as compared
with fewer large ones, is conducive to the spread of the
risk of non-payment of rentals and taxes, and it also tends
to minimize the gamble of redemption.
150 But see the deed of a fee and the lease back of a leasehold for ninetynine years renewable forever in Montague v. Sewell, 57 Md. 407 (1881) ;
Odd Fellows Association v. Merklin, 65 Md. 579, 5 A. 544 (1886) ; Oxenham v. Mitchell, 160 Md. 269, 153 A. 71 (1930) discussed in n. 131, supra.
See also the remarks of Mr. Chief Justice Taney, n. 141, supra.
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At certain periods in the past, ground rents have possessed a tax advantage over mortgages. For instance, at
one time mortgagees were subjected to a separate tax on
the interest covenanted to be paid, in addition to the regular property tax paid by the mortgagor, on the unencumbered value of the property, as the man in possession.15 '
But under the State Income Tax of 1939,152 ground rent
owners have been treated exactly like mortgagees and
other investment owners, and required to pay a state income tax of six per cent on rents collected by them.
The legislature, in the 1939 income tax act, attempted
to prevent ground rent lessors from shifting the tax on
their ground rent income to their leaseholders, but in
Oursler v. Tawes, 53 where the constitutionality of that act
was litigated, the Court of Appeals, in one section of its
54
opinion, stated: 1
"Turning now to the provisions of section 223 (C)
which provides that no tax imposed on any person
with respect to income from ground rents received
by him shall be collected from the lessee by the lessor;
and is designed to invalidate any agreement between
such parties to the contract. We are of the opinion
that the effect of section 223 (C) is to impair the obligation of a contract and is therefore in conflict with
Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United
States.155 Accordingly, we declare the same unconstitutional."
151 Md. Laws 1896, Ch. 120 imposing an 8% tax on Interest covenanted
to be paid. Repealed by Md. Laws 1904, Ch. 405 for Baltimore City and
fourteen counties. In force for some of the other counties from 1904
on to 1933. Md. Code (1924) Art. 81, Sec. 198. In force In Frederick
County till 1933. Md. Code Pub. Loc. L. (1930) Art. 11, sec. 75; repealed
as to Frederick County, Md. Laws 1933, Ch. 400.
152 Md. Laws 1939, Ch. 277, Sec. 215 (K) and (N), See. 223; Md. Code
(1939), Art. 81, Sec. 222, discussed in Lewis, The Taxation of Maryland
Ground Rents (1939) 3 Md. L. Rev. 314, 323-325; see Kelly, The Maryland Cla8sified Income Ta, of 1939 (1940) 5 Md. L. Rev. 77, circa n.
55 therein, where is discussed the classification of ground rent Income
as "investment income" In the same category as mortgage income, and
of ordinary rent in a different category.
15813 A. (2d) 763 (Md. 1940).
15113 A. (2d) 763, 770 (Md. 1940) ; see Kelly, supra n. 152, circa n. 60
therein, where it is stated that the argument concerning the constitutionality of Section 230(c) was not an Important Issue in the case.
151 "No State shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of
contracts ..
"
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Thus, the Court held that the 1939 act did not and
could not abrogate the obligation of leaseholders under
ground rent indentures, executed before the passage of
the act, to pay the state income tax on rental payments
received by the lessor, if such an obligation existed. The
Court has yet to specifically declare, however, whether it
will construe the usual covenant to pay taxes, which appears in the standard ground rent leasing agreement, to
cover payment of state and/or federal income taxes. The
argument supporting the exclusion of payment of federal
income taxes is particularly strong, since the federal tax
is on net income, and not directly on rental income, as is
the state tax. However, the Court may conclude that the
parties to ground rent indentures did not covenant with income taxes in mind, and construe the covenant to pay
taxes as relating only to property taxes.
If the Court does hold that leaseholders under ground
rent leases executed before 1939 must pay an income tax
on rentals collected from them, it would seem that a great
deal of confusion would result, for the amount of the tax
to be paid by the individual leaseholder would depend on
the interrelation of other taxable income, and personal
credits and exemptions possessed by the lessor. It is therefore probable that many ground rent holders would themselves pay the tax on their rental collections, rather than
go through the bother and confusion of shifting the tax.
This might be particularly true of those who own more attractive rents, for they would not wish to irritate their
leaseholders into redeeming their rents and seeking to
execute new ground rent leases under which they would
be specifically exempted from liability for the income tax
assessed to their landlords. Such an attitude on the part
of ground rent owners would seem all the wiser when one
remembers that the amount of the tax due on the income
from any particular rent would be so relatively small.
But the confusion resulting from the shifting of the
state tax would be slight by comparison with the difficulties that would be caused by any attempt by ground rent
owners to shift part of their federal income taxes. For
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they would face the added obstacle of a graduated tax.
Indeed, it is hard to perceive how such a system would
work out in practice. And if it were worked out, the lessor
would have to pay a federal income tax on the tax payment
made for him by his lessee, for the payment of taxes
for a person constitutes additional taxable income to him.156
But whatever the result of the difficulties growing out
of the 1939 tax and the Court's treatment of it, they have
apparently not affected the ground rent market. Indeed,
ground rents are still selling at about the same rate as they
did before the tax went into effect and there are no signs
yet of an increase or a decrease in the demand for them.
Probably the basic reason is that the idea of getting a good
return on a relatively safe investment which can be easily
liquidated unless the property has badly depreciated, is
exceedingly inviting to the investor of today. Indeed, at
the present time good newly created ground rents are in
so much demand that they are selling at a premium; and
some trust companies are willing to pay as high as 51/4%
or 5Y8% for them. These companies figure that their rents
will most likely not be redeemed and that even if they are,
their five-year net yield will more than equal the yield on
government bonds.'"
VIII.

ADVANCE BUILDING.

"Advance" or "bonus" building was the term applied
to a system which grew up as the direct outcome of competition between vacant lot owners to improve their property and sell it to the public, usually subject to ground
rents. On the whole, this competition was beneficial to
the community for it led to a constant supply of houses
at what were probably rather low prices. But around
156 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 U.
S. 716, 73 L. Ed. 918 (1929) ; United States v. Boston and Maine Rd. Co.,
279 U. S. 732, 73 L. Ed. 929 (1929).
157 Some persons, however, have felt that too much Baltimore capital
is invested In ground rents and that particularly before the World War
this was responsible for restraining the commercial and industrial growtlh
of the city. Hobbs, The Good and Bad of Ground Rent8, Baltimore Evej
ning Sun, March 24, 1937, p. 27.
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the turn of the century, it apparently was not an unmixed
blessing.'5 8 Under this system, the land-owner advanced
previously agreed-upon sums of money to the builder upon
the completion of each story of the house to be erected.
It was claimed that this caused landowners to place greater
valuations on their lots than would otherwise have been
justified. This claim seems to be merely a segment of
the general criticism of the ground rent system, which is
still often heard today-that the ground rent system is
responsible for inflated land values.
The claim is that people have paid more for land subject to a ground rent than it is worth. This in a sense
may be true, for a man might pay more money for leasehold property subject to a ground rent, when the capitalized value of the ground rent is added in, than he would
for the fee simple title to the property. But this is because he would rather assume, let us say, a $60 ground rent
than pay an extra $1,000 or be subject to a mortgage payment of $1,000. However, it must be admitted that there
has been a tendency on the part of builders and real
estate agents to make eager home purchasers buy over
their heads by causing them to think in terms of a $60
ground rent rather than in terms of $1,000 investment 5
A valid criticism of the "advance" or "bonus" system
that was being made around the turn of the century was
that all too often the builder who had contracted to build
the house found himself unable to complete his contract
and that that portion of the house which was unfinished
fell into the hands of the landowner. The latter, of course,
would immediately sell it for what it would bring. He
would do this by creating a ground rent on the partially
improved premises and selling the leasehold interest. He
would either retain the ground rent himself, or sell it and
thus cash in entirely at the beginning.
168 Ground Rent System in Baltimore, 6th Annual Report of the Bureau of Industrial Statistics (for 1897), 85-87.
Houses put up by bonus builders were sometimes so badly built that
resulting repair bills caused abandonment. Hyde, News Article, Baltimore Evening Sun, February 2, 1921, pp. 1, 2.
211 Supra n. 141.
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What hardship was there in this? From the point of
view of the would-be house-purchasers, there was none.
Indeed, it was welcomed by them as they were able to
buy at bargain prices. But from the point of view of the
mechanics and laborers who had worked on the house and
who had not secured their wages from the builder, the system was quite unfair. Today, they would be protected by
the Mechanics' Lien Law. 160 But until that law was
amended by the acts of 1898 and 1910, it was so defective
that it prevented the laborers and mechanics from placing effective liens. This naturally led to many protests
and some agitation against the "advance" building system,
but it would seem that the fault lay not with that system,
but only in the then defective Mechanics' Lien Law and
that once that law was amended, the trouble was disposed
61
of.1
IX.

THE SO-CALLED TAX INJUSTICE.

The law of Maryland treats the holder of a leasehold
interest as the party liable to assessment for taxation of
the entire property at its fee simple value. 6 2 This may
be defended not only on the ground that the lessee has
assumed an express contractual obligation to pay the tax,
but also on the ground that the price paid by him for the
10

6 Md. Laws 1898, Ch. 502, and Md. Laws 1910, Ch. 52 codified as Md.
Code (1939) Art. 63, Sees. 1, 2. The Mechanics' Lien Law as it Is in
force in the counties protects material men as well as mechanics and
laborers. As it is in force in Baltimore City it protects only the latter
groups.
E lven before that law was changed, there was developed a related
system which protected both workers and materialmen. Under this alternate plan, the lot owner contracted with a builder to erect a row of
buildings, and with dealers in building material to furnish supplies,
agreeing to pay them by turning over to them one or more of the houses
to be constructed. This of course, had the same effect upon the price
of new houses as the "advance" system since as soon as they were
completed, they were quickly thrown upon the market by the builders
and materlalmen who naturally wished to convert their end of the bargain Into ready cash.
"'There are three types of state ground rent taxes which have been
used at different times, Lewis, op. cit. 8upra, n. 152, 314, 315-316. Note
that It has been said that in the absence of any tax covenant in the lease,
the liability of the entire tax would rest on the leaseholder and that
Hughes v. Young, 5 G. and J. 67 (Md. 1832) stands for this proposition.
For a contention that this is not so, see Lewis, op. cit. supra n. 152, 314,
316, n. 8. See also a discussion of Md. Laws 1929, Ch. 226, Sec. 3, codifled as Md. Code (1939) Art. 81, See. 3 (c) at Lewis, op. cit. supra, n. 152,
314, 318, Sec. 3 (c).
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leasehold estate allowed for and reflected the tax burden
assumed by him at the time of purchase. For if, at that
time, the ground rent landlord had remained liable for
property taxes, the selling price of the leasehold interest
would have been greater.
In fact, it is rather hard to see any good reason why a
leaseholder should not pay real estate taxes on property
in which he has a leasehold interest. This becomes particularly clear when it is recalled that no one has ever
suggested that a mortgagor should be relieved from paying taxes on the entire mortgaged premises on the ground
that he was only the owner of an equity in that property.
On the contrary, it has always been true that if the value
of premises subject to a fee mortgage increases, the mortgagor is subject to a higher assessment on the property.
This of course is just since the increase in value primarily
inures to his benefit as the real owner and is important
to the mortgagee only in so far as it builds up additional
security for his loan. In the same way, it is fair that a
leaseholder be charged with the increase in value of the
premises he is occupying or has a right to occupy; for since
he has the rights of perpetual use and enjoyment of that
property, he and not the ground rent man is the primary
beneficiary of any increase in its value. The ground rent
owner, it is true, receives some of the benefit of any increase in value of the premises, but this benefit is in regard
to an improvement of his ground rent investment along
the same lines as a long term mortgage investment is improved by an increase in the value of the security behind
it. 163
And yet, at one time, there was considerable dissatisfaction with and criticism of the taxing authorities for
assessing the full value of the premises to the leaseholder
and considerable agitation for legislation forbidding the
1" Note also that if taxes are not paid on property subject to a ground
rent, and the land is sold at a tax sale, the leasehold alone is sold if it
will bring enough to satisfy the tax claim. Md. Laws 1929, Ch. 226,
Sec. 73 codified as Md. Code (1939) Art. 81, Sec. 77. This statutory provision is in line with the contention that leaseholders, as the real owners,
should be responsible for real estate taxes on property they have a right
to use.
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enforcement of covenants to pay taxes on the entire property which are of course present in all ground rent demises.
The city, in an effort to explain to leaseholders why
they were taxed on the full value of the premises, published several articles in the Municipal Journal. One published in 1915, was entitled "Why is My Assessment Substantially Higher than the Purchase Price Paid for My
Home?""'
In this article, the case of a man who had
bought a home for $1,500, subject to a $60 ground rent,
was discussed. It was shown that he was assessed at
$2,500 and could not understand why. The article explained this seeming mistake by pointing out that this
leaseholder had signed a lease which included a covenant to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and
description levied against the property and advised prospective lessees to read their leases carefully, implying that
lessees in the past had been misled into signing leases
which included tax covenants. 6 5 No mention was made
that the price the lessee paid was reckoned on the basis
of his paying the taxes. No mention was made that a leaseholder under a ground rent is a first cousin to a mortgagor
and that no mortgagor ever complains about paying the
taxes levied against the entire mortgaged property.
The writer of the article fell into the same error that
has characterized the basic dissatisfaction with the assessment of the entire property to the leaseholder. He spoke
of the leasehold and the house as if they were synonymous.
The following inquiry, addressed to the Baltimore News,
by a correspondent, exhibits this misunderstanding most
clearly:
"Will you kindly tell me what law or section of
the Maryland Laws provides that the person owning
a house on ground is compelled to pay taxes on the
ground when the ground is owned by some one else.' 66
164 Baltimore Municipal Journal, January 22, 1915; Later reprinted and
distributed in pamphlet form.
" The same tactics were used in an article in the Baltimore Municipal
Journal, July 28, 1916.
166 This inquiry, written out on a form
blank, was addressed to E. A.
Doetsch, Editor of the Woman's Inquiry Column of the Baltimore News
on June 20, 1913. It was referred to Judge Oscar Leser of the Appeal
Tax Court of Baltimore City.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. V

The answer to this question is that the lessee under a
ground rent lease does not "own" the house and that the
ground rent holder does not "own" the ground. Each has
an interest in both. The leaseholder owns the leasehold
interest which is a far different thing than the house. At
one time, it was probably true that the value of the ground
rent was roughly equivalent to the value of the bare ground
-the unimproved lot.167 When that was the case, the
ground rent at first glance did apparently equal the value
of the lot, and the leasehold the value of the building.
But this was only so when the value of the lot equalled
the amount of the ground rent. Just as soon as the lot
began to decline in value, the ground rent began to eat
into the house. This is so, because a ground rent like a
mortgage covers the entire premises-and because both
house and lot are security for the ground rent. For instance, when a lessee under a ground rent defaults, the
ground rent owner can eject him from both house and
land. Note also that the ground rent man can prevent
the leaseholder from impairing his security by destroying
the house and other improvements." 8
In recent years, however, there has been even less excuse for laboring under the delusion that a lessee is the
owner of the house. 6 ' For ground rents almost always
exceed the lot value and eat considerably into the improvements. Therefore, it would seem clear that what the leaseholder owns is the equity remaining in both house and lot
after subtracting the capitalized rental payment. At least
this is so in regard to any lessee under a term which is
five years old. Before the five year mark is reached, there
may be some additional detriment to the lessee because of

'"8 Mayer,

op. cit. 8upra n. 2, 56, 57.
"' The law of waste ordinarily applicable to the relation of landlord
and tenant does not apply to a ground rent relationship, again exhibiting that a ground rent lease is not the same as an ordinary lease. Crowe
v. Wilson, 65 Md. 479, 5 AtI. 427, 57 A. R. 343 (1886).
See also supra
circa n. 99. A leaseholder is free to tear down, rebuild, and remodel the
buildings and improvements of his leasehold so long as he does not render the ground rent investment insecure. If he does render it insecure,
equity will enjoin his actions on request of the ground rent owner. Crowe
v. Wilson, supra.
169 Cf. Editorial, Ground Rent Critics, Baltimore Real Estate News,
June 1938, vol. 6, No. 6, pp. 8, 9, defending payment of taxes by lessees.
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his inability immediately to exercise his statutory option
of redemption.
Nevertheless, it was not so long ago that there was
quite some agitation directed toward compelling the
ground rent owner to pay the taxes on the land because
he was said to own the land outright. 7 ' A movement in
1912 to impose an income tax on income accruing from
ground rents apparently grew out of this feeling.' 7 ' Then
in 1914, a more serious attempt was made to "get at" the
ground rent owners. This time, the agitators went so
far as to introduce and to secure the passage of a resolution through both branches of the City Council of Baltimore which demanded that the Maryland legislature prohibit the enforcement of the lessee's covenant to pay the
taxes.172 Such legislation fortunately never came. Of
course, if it had been constitutional, such legislation could
have been offset by future ground rent owners who would
have taken the law into account in setting rental rates.
Still, nevertheless, it would have caused them as well as
the taxing authorities a great deal of inconvenience.
For even assuming that a law passed as a result of this
resolution would have recognized that a ground rent, like
a mortgage, covers the entire premises, the problem of the
tax assessors would have been fairly complex. Bear in
mind that the tax concerned was a tax on the property
as a whole. The agitators wanted the ground rent owner
to pay the tax on his interest and the leaseholder the tax
170 Real estate brokers had Just as hard a time as did the tax assessors
in convincing leaseholders that they were similar to mortgagees, that
they owned leaseholds and not houses, that the leasehold covered both
house and ground, and that it was necessary for them to pay commission based on the value of the entire premises. The Broker's Commission,
Baltimore Real Estate Board Bulletin, November 12, 1920 and Is a Ground
Rent a Mortgage? Baltimore Real Estate Board Bulletin, November 26,
1920.
"I Baltimore American, February 20, 1912.
The movement to impose an income tax died down because of an
opinion by Deputy City Solicitor Preston that the proposed tax would
be a violation of the Constitution of Maryland. Md. Code (1924), Constitution of Maryland (1867), Declaration of Rights, Art. 15. See Baltimore American, March 1, 1912.
172 The resolution was introduced by City Councilman John F. O'Meara,
long one of the principal agitators against the "unjust" system of taxation of ground rent properties. *It was introduced in the council on January 12, 1914 and passed June 19, 1914.
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on his interest. This would probably have been done by
taking the value of a ground rent in the eyes of the leaseholder and assessing the ground rent owner at that value
and the leaseholder at the difference between that value
and the value of the premises as a whole. 17 8
Perhaps the assessors could have devised a workable system of separate taxation. Perhaps also, wouldbe ground rent owners would have stomached the added inconvenience. But these problems need not detain us any
longer, for happily, the O'Meara Resolution, based on an
entirely false premise, is buried in obscurity.
X.

TODAY AND TOMORROW.

Baltimore has time and time again been called a city
of home-owners and it has been rather generally conceded
that this accomplishment is due in a large measure to the
growth of the redeemable ground rent system under which
there has been a minimum of foreclosures.17 4 Working
hand in glove with the "advance" or "bonus" system,'7 5
and the policy of building and loan associations, this system has gained for Baltimore a title of which it has due
cause to be proud.
This does not mean that the existing ground rent system as a whole has achieved perfection. Indeed, it is far
from perfect. For one thing there are still a certain num178But see Latrobe v. Baltimore City, 101 Md. 621, 61 A. 203 (1905)
where the Court was faced with the problem of valuation of an irredeemable ground rent and the leasehold under it and recognized that
their sum value might exceed the value of the property. In the case of
a redeemable rent, it might also be true that the investment value of the
ground rent would exceed its redemption price and thus exceed its value
in the eyes of the leaseholder. The excess would represent an investor's
hope that no redemption would take place. This last consideration would
probably be too speculative for assessment purposes.
17,Pitt, In Explanation of Ground Rents, National Real Estate Journal, May 24, 1925, vol. 26, no. 9. See the contention that Baltimore had
so few labor troubles because workingmen were home-owners. Ferguson,
In Defense of Baltimore's Ground Rent System, Baltimore Evening Sun,
January 14, 1914. And see also, Hyde, News Article, Baltimore Evening
Sun, February 2, 1921, pp. 1, 2; Hobbs, The Good and Bad of Ground Rents,
Baltimore Evening Sun, March 24, 1937, p. 27; Hearn, Those Row Houses
and Ground Rents, Baltimore Sunday Sun, December 19, 1937, Mag. Sec.,
pp. 5, 7. This latter article refers to Baltimore as the "City of Home
Ownership" and states that without row houses and ground rents Baltimore might not have escaped the tenement problem of other large cities.
175 Supra circa notes 157-161.
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ber of irredeemable ground rents in existence. 7 ' The
sooner they die out entirely, the better it will be for the
good of the city and the reputation of the system. However, it will probably be many years and perhaps several
centuries before all the irredeemables are gone.
Then also, there are many existing problems in connection with the redeemable ground rent system. For instance, in some sections of Baltimore, rents are seemingly
too high, in others too low. They usually appear to be
too high in the neighborhoods which were once desirable
ones but have now fallen greatly in desirability. Probably the persons in possession hold on sub-leases and so
are not paying excessive rents. But the original lessee,
or his successor in title, is still paying the original rent
unless he has suffered forfeiture or has concluded a new
arrangement with the ground rent owner.'7 7
Rents also often seem very low in down-town sections
of the city where many concerns pay only a small percentage of the rental worth of their property. However,
there is no evil in this and these concerns are in no different position than if they had purchased the fee in the
property years ago.
In fact, in a sense, ground rents cannot be too high or
too low. If a man buys property in fee and it depreciates
in value, the man loses money. If the property appreciates, his investment has become more valuable. Now
if he purchases subject to a ground rent and the property
depreciates in value, the rent is apparently too high. But
when one remembers that the ground rent represents part
of the purchase price, then it becomes apparent that the
176 Hyde, News Article, Baltimore Evening Sun, February 2, 1921, pp.
1, 2, mentioned the existence of a $200 irredeemable ground rent on a strip
of land under the bed of the lake in Druid Hill Park which was being
paid every year by the City Water Department and also noted a $120
ground rent on a $70,000 building on Saratoga street in down-town Baltimore owned by an old negro living in a cabin in Howard County, Maryland, who had been given the rent by his master many years ago.
17 Wise ground rent owners adjust rents, but many insist on full rentals
and as a result sometimes run right into tax foreclosures. Hobbs, The
Good and Bad of Ground Rents, Baltimore Evening Sun, March 24, 1931,
p. 27. As a rule, leaseholders will continue to pay rent under an existing arrangement only so long as they have sufficient equity in the property
to justify their hanging on.
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rent is too high, as far as he is concerned, only in the same
way as the original purchase price paid for property seems
too high after the property has become less valuable.
However, it is also well to note that when a man has bought
property in fee and has made a down-payment and then
sees that property depreciate, he can write off that loss
and forget about it. If he buys it subject to a ground rent,
unless he can refinance, he must either allow himself to
be wiped out or he must continue to "pay through the
nose." He never gets through taking his loss and this may
be objectionable since it prevents this man from starting
over with a new slate.
Also it is well to consider that the amount of a ground
rent may be too high or too low from the standpoint of
the investor owning a ground rent, for it may be that the
capitalized value of the ground rent is so close to the value
of the premises that there is little or no cushion left as
security.
One rather bad aspect of the system was taken care
of in the last session of the legislature when a law was
passed requiring advertisements of leasehold properties
for sale to specify the amount of the ground rent burdening the property.1 7 If this law is enforced, purchasers of
real estate will at least be warned when they are buying
leasehold property, though of course they can never be
sure of the actual number of ground rents encumbering
the premises until they have had its title searched.
This law might well be amended so as to require advertisements to include not only the amount of the ground
rent, but whether or not it is redeemable; and if it is redeemable, at what capitalized value and after what date
it can be redeemed. This would certainly tend to enlighten
leasehold purchasers.
But if all leaseholders are to be fully informed, the
legislature will have to do more than promulgate rules
of advertising. It will need to prescribe several additions
to the common form of ground rent lease that is in vogue.
"IMd.

Laws 1939, Ch. 500, codified as Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Sec. 209.
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For this form is substantially the same as it was in the
eighteenth century7 9 and bears no mention of the lessee's
statutory option to redeem or of the legislative provisions
for automatic renewal. 180 It would seem very desirable
for the legislature to require specific reference to both
these changes in each and every ground rent lease. '
In addition, there is some feeling that it will be neces8 2
sary to curb what is called ground rent racketeering;
but this feeling is almost altogether misfounded. The
"racketeers" are said to be persons who go around soliciting the refinancing of ground rents which are yielding
higher returns than are necessary to attract investment.
They will offer to finance the redemption of such ground
rents by lending to lessees who do not possess sufficient
sums themselves to redeem the rents.
In return, these "racketeers" arrange with the lessees
to create new ground rents and sell them at a premium,
sharing the resulting profits with the lessees. From their
point of view, and indeed also from the point of view of
the lessee and the community in general, this refinancing
is good business and is in line with the policy of refinancing of mortgages at lower rates adopted by the HOLC.
However, it is true that some rents have been refinanced
by door to door solicitors who have pocketed most of the
profits of refinancing at the expense of uninformed leaseholders. If such occurrences took place frequently, remedial legislation would be necessary. But they are the
exception rather than the rule.'1 8
In general it would appear necessary to conclude that
the redeemable ground rent system is in rather healthy
condition today. That it will be retained in Baltimore
179 Supra circa n. 49.

11* Supra circa n. 55, ft.
181 Note also the discussion, supra circa notes 69-72, regarding the position
8 of leasehold mortgagees.
2 2 Liss, The Ground Rent Syatem in Maryland, Baltimore Daily Record,

August 6, 1937.

188 For a ruling by the Committee on Professional Ethics of the Bar
Association of Baltimore City that a lawyer may not solicit redemption of
ground rents for the purpose of recreating the rent and selling it at a
profit in which the lawyer would share, see the Baltimore Daily Record,
May 20, 1937.
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seems almost beyond doubt. For it has made Baltimore a
city of few tenements and many homes1 4 and has provided a type of safe investment which sold at or near par
during the entire depression.
Why hasn't it been adopted elsewhere? For one thing
similar systems have been .developed elsewhere, particularly in Pennsylvania.'8 "
For another, the exact form of
the present Maryland system "just sort of" evolved by accident and has been under more or less steady fire in its
birthplace until recently. Also, new cities are no longer
springing up in this country and old cities have their own
ways of financing real property. And so probably there is
little chance for the spread of the Baltimore ground rent
mechanism. Even if other communities wished to adopt
it, they would undoubtedly desire to adopt with it the
redemption, renewal and other remedial legislation which
so greatly affects the present status of the system. In addition, they might desire legislation specifically validating
covenants for redemption unless they were entirely sure
that their courts would adhere to the rule of Hollander
v. Central Metal Co. and reject the strict English rule. 88
But it would certainly appear that other communities
might find it advisable to study Maryland's redeemable
ground rents, for on the whole they go to make up a very
beneficial system, which, with a slight bit of legislative remodelling, can be made even more beneficial, and much
less mysterious.
I18Supra n. 173.
115 The treatise
on Pennsylvania ground rents comparable to Mayer's
text on the Maryland system is CADWALADK9, GROUND RENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA

(1879).

For the view that ground rents exist only In Maryland and Pennsylvania, see 14 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law (2d ed. 1900) 1121. This view
seems mistaken. Ground rents or similar interests seemingly exist in
many jurisdictions. See 28 C. J. 839, 840, 841 stating that there are
ground rent or similar systems in Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, and
eighteen other states, and the District of Columbia, and Porto Rico.
In Ohio and other parts of the mid-west, the land trust or fee certificate system, which also involves a ninety-nine year lease renewable forever, is in vogue. See Bingham and Andrews, FINANCING REAL ESTATE
(1924) Ch. 20; Note, Land Trusts as a Method of Finance (1939) 52 Harv.
L. Rev. 1149.
18 109 Md. 131, 71 A. 442, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1135 (1908), discussed
supra circa notes 60-63.

